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CHAI>TER I 
KOREA--DILEMMA AND DISASTER 
A divided nation. At the end of World War II Korea 
was occupied by the forces of the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The Thirty-eighth Parallel was arbitrarily set 
as the boundary between the forces of occupation. This 
arbitrary boundary was not intended to result in the creation 
of two separate governments; rather it was to prevent the 
Soviet forces from occupying the whole nation. Korea had 
been under Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945. At the Cairo 
Conference in 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek 
declared that in due course Korea should become free and in-
dependent. This was later reaffirmed at Potsdam in 1945. At 
the end of \1/orld War II Russian troops were massed along the 
Manchurian border, while the nearest American forces were in 
Okinawa. Thus the military division of Korea was solely in-
tended for the purpose of temporary occupation of the mili-
tary forces. 
Even before the outbreak of the Korean War that na-
tion had become a political headache for the United States. 
The cost of occupation was high, and troop morale was low. 
Furthermore, South Korea thought the occupation had gone on 
long enough, even though it needed American help. All at-
tempts to unify the nation. by a United Nations supervised 
2 
election failed due to Soviet opposition. A South Korean 
government was formed in Aui:;us t 1948 with :3yngma.n Hhee as its 
first President. In September 1948 the North Korean govern-
ment was created. Rhea apparently felt that police state 
.methods were needed to kec1p the Communists from taking over 
in South Korea. However, in April 1950, the State Department 
felt it necessary to itmrn Dr. Rhee that further American 
assistance would be withheld unless he balanced his budget, 
inaugurated democratic reforms, and held elections. J:Uec-
tions were held on May 30, 1950. Rhea's party retained only 
22 of 210 seats. 1 l'Jhatever degree of dictatorial methods 
Rhee used in the past, dictators do not allow themselves to 
be be<1ten in elections, and South Korea had experienced the 
workings of the most basic of democratic institutions. 
In a move extremely well calculated to create an a\vk-
ward situation for the United States, the Soviet Union an-
nounced the complete wi thdrav1al of its occupation forces 
from Korea effective December 25, 1948. Since Soviet troops 
were v-.ri t.hdrawn only to the .Hanchurian border all the s tra-
tet._;ic and propaganda benefits accrued to Moscow. It was a 
clever move. 111 thdrawal of American troops to Japan was corn-
pleted June 29, 1949. While the Soviets had left a well 
trained and equipped North Korean Army, the forces of South 
1 John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 189:-
Korea had neither the training not the equipment to match 
North Korea's. 
Korea and :Formosa are excluded from the defense 
---- - - - ...;;;..;;.;.;..;:;.=.;;;. 
perimeter .2f ~United States. In a statement made to the 
3 
National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State 
Acheson said that both Korea and Formosa were outside the 
defense perimeter of the United States. 2 This did not alter 
the fact that both areas were still the responsibility of the 
United Nations. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that such a 
statement could have accomplished anything, and it was both 
unnecessary and unwise, even if it were true at the time. 
Combined with the recent withdrawal of United States forces, 
it seemed to suggest an open door for aggression in South 
Korea. 
The significani military developments in Korea. The 
North Korean Communists, under the leadership of Hoscow-
trained Kim Il-sung, were willing to discuss unification of 
Korea, but they flatly refused to deal with the government 
of Syngman Rhee for that purpose. In short, it was clear 
that what they wanted was Communist unification instead of a 
democratic Korea. 
On June 25, 1950, the forces of North Korea crossed 
2 Time, June 11, 1951, p. 23. 
the Thirty-eighth Parallel (June 24, in the United States). 
Secretary of State Acheson immediately advised Trye;ve Lie, 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, of this action. 
Hr. Ide called an emergency meeting of the Security Council 
for Sunday·, June 25. The Security Council condemned the 
invasion and called for an irmnedia to cease fire and with-
drawal of North Korean troops from South Korea. The vote 
in the Security Council was nine to zero. Yugoslavia ab-
stained from voting, and Russia was not present. The 
Soviet Union had boycotted the Security Council meetings 
since January. 
President Truman ordered General MacArthur to give 
immediate military support to the forces of South Korea. 
The President did not, then or in the future, ask Congress 
for a declaration of v.tar. i!owever, the majority of Con-
gress, Republican as well as Democrats, approved the Pres-
ident • s action. rrechnically Mr. Truman acted as Commander 
in Chief of the armed forces in response to a request from 
the United Nations Security Council. This is the expla-
nation of the reference to the Korean War as a "police 
action." 
General t1acArthur vms designated Supreme Commander 
of the United Nations forces in Korea. The United States 
and South Korea furnished the bulk of the fighting forces, 
but several nations sent contin~ents of ground troops and 
4 
naval or ,;:;,ir unit~> to Korea. 'l'he United J t~·l.t,~s could not 
jeopa.rdi ze its occupation forces in Japan, a.nd it was some 
time before effective military pressure could be brought to 
bear. Tne consequence of this situation was that during 
July and Au.t;us t, 1950 the (forth KorHan forces pushed the 
'3outh Koro:m and United :3tates armies into the southeast 
corner of Korea 1 known as tho Pusan beachhead. 
During September and October, the United ~L:ttions 
forces began to counter-attack. A brilliant amphibious 
landinG was conceived and directed by MacArthur at Inchon on 
the west coast of Korea. The situation involved landing at 
a city t.mder incredible tidd.l condi tio:ns. On ~1cptember 15, 
the tide rose to 30 feet in six ·hours; in the next six hours 
it fell to six feet. 3 ·rne landing l1ad to be made at hiGh 
tide. There were also the problems of enemy magnetic mines, 
shore batteries, and the possibility of Chinese entry into 
the -..var about tha. t time. The purpose of this at tack vm.s to 
hit the enemy in the rear, and cut off his forward units. 
ne did not have strength in depth. This v1ould disrupt his 
supply lines and make pos;::;ible the retaking of Seoul, the 
capital of South Korea, which was in enemy hands. The risks 
were Great, but the results proved that it was worth the 
3 Charles A. VJilloughby, Major General, MacArthur 
1.241,-1221 (New Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), 
p. 369. 
5 
6 
gamble. The whole operation was a tribute to MacArthur's 
military ability. The Thirty-eighth Parallel was exposed to 
the forces of the United Nations• and a turning point in the 
war had been reached. 
In the United Nations and in the capitals of the world 
there was much discussion about what to do next. There were 
reports that the Chinese Communists ~t~ould enter the fighting 
if the United Nations forces crossed the Thirty-eighth Par-
allel. The military problem was one thing; the political 
problem another. This is why democracies require that the 
military authority be subordinate to the civil authorities. 
In tb:Ls case North Korea had invaded South Korea and had been 
pushed back into its own territory. Not wishing to antag-
onize Com..rnunist China, some members of the United Nations 
strongly urged that the fighting not be carried into North 
Korea. Great Britain v1as the principal advocate of this po-
sition. However, l~a.cArthur was given permission to cross 
into North Korea, and on October 91 the United Nations forces 
inv1aded ~forth Korea. Within three weeks his troops 1t1ere 
nearing the Hanchurian border. 
On October 3, the State Department reported that the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, had advised the Indian 
Ambassador at Peiping that if United Nations forces crossed 
the Thirty-eighth Parallel China would send troops to help 
the North Koreans. However, this action would not be taken 
7 
if only South Koreans crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel. 4 
There was involved in this the problem of determining wheth-
er this warning was so much propaganda, or a true statement 
of their intentions. 
President Truman decided that he wanted to have a 
personal talk with General MacArthur. The General had been 
out of the United States for fourteen years and, according 
to the President, "all his thoughts were wrapped up in the 
East. 11 5 In addition the President felt that in spite of the 
Administration's attempt to keep MacArthur advised on the 
world-wide picture as seen in Washington, it had not sue-
ceeded. "I thought," said the President, "he might adjust 
more easily if he heard it from me directly. 116 Finally, the 
Peiping threats of intervention in Korea were another reason 
for the President's desire to confer with MacArthur. 
The meeting took place at Wake Island on October 15, 
local time. In his Memoirs, the President said that Mac-
Arthur had assured him that victory had been won in Korea, 
and that the Chinese Communists would not attack. 7 
MacArthur's biographers do not agree with the Presi-
dent regarding the reasons for the meeting at Wake Island 
or with the results which the President concluded from the 
4 Harry s. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2 (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), P• 363. 
5 Loc. cit. 
--
6 Loc. cit. 
--
7 Ibid., P• 365. 
meeting. In his book, MacArthur ] 241-1951M, Najor General 
Charles Willoughby observed: 8 
8 
vli th an eye to the coming elections, it v1as expedient 
for the President to smooth over the differences • • • 
with his principal field commander. • • • It was equal-
ly expedient to exploit politically the smashing victory 
at Inchon and directly link the Administration with this 
impressive success. 
l~azier Hunt concluded, "Despite the outwardly 
friendly nnture of thE~ visit there seem to have been very 
few, if any tangible results." 9 He also no ted that the tvlO 
men most concerned with the developments in the .Far East and 
with the rise or fall of General MacArthur--Secretary of 
State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Marshall--had remained 
in \>Jashington. \Vi th all due resp~;ct to Hunt's wisdom and 
experience, it is hard to see how bringing Marshall and 
Acheson to \1/ake Island could have helped the relationship 
between 1'rurnan and MacArthur. Furthermore, there was great-
er need :for them in V/ashington while the Chief Executive was 
out of the country. 
Late in November l'1acArthur ordered a general advance, 
hoping to end the war "before Christmas." His troops were 
t.hreatening the N;:;mchurian border and the pov1er houses along 
the Yalu River, when the character o:f the vJar changed. 
8 Willoughby, Q£• £11., p. 382. 
9 l"razier Hunt, The Untold Story of General MacArthur 
(Nmv York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1954), p. 477. 
-l 
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Chinese troops crossed the border from Manchuria and 
launched a major counteroffensive. A thrust by the Chinese 
split the United Nations forces in two. Those in the north-
east \vere surrounded and trapped, but were finally evacuated 
by sea from the port of Hungnam. Although the evacuation 
was made possible by highly skillful operations of the 
United States Navy, it was a :Far EastE~rn Dunkirk. It was 
not long before the remaining United Nations forces were 
driven back below the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and there was 
considerable alarm that the United Nations might be forced 
back to the old Pusan beachhead. There was also concern 
that the "limited war" might turn into World War III. 
In late January ttnd February, 1951 t the United 
Nations forces halted the enemy advance and began a series 
of cautious advances. By the end of March, United Nations 
forces again reached the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and in some 
places advanced beyond it. 
CHAP'TER II 
THE MacAR'!HUR CONFJ,ICT 
The events leading 1Q the dismissal Q! General ~­
/irthur. \·/hila the United Stt:\tes put forth most of the effort 
in fighting the Korean War, it was done in the name of the 
United Nations. One of the major considerations of the 
United r~ations \1as to keep the local war from becoming a 
world war. England had special reasons for keeping the war 
limited to Korea, since any threat to China would undoubtedly 
result in a counter threat to the British colony, Hong Kong. 
Consequently the United L-Hates was not free to malw the de-
cisions and determine the measures that should be used for 
winning the war; the decis1ons were not ours alone. 
The Truman Administration had written off Chiang Kai-
shek as a bad risk; it felt that it was throwing good money 
after bad to support him. This was also the British view. 
MacArthur, on the other hand, seemed to·balieve that we ought 
to give him the respect due a friend. But there was more to 
it than that. On July 31, 1950, MacArthur suddenly flew to 
Formosa and spent a day and a half consulting with the Gen-
eralissimo. Neither TruiD.f'J.n nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
v;ere informed beforehand of this trip. However, as the Amer-
ican commander in Japan and the United Nations commander in 
Korea, he had both the right and the duty to inspect the For-
mosa area, since he had the specific duty to defend it. On 
June 27, 1950, President ·rruman had ordered the neutraliza-
tion of Formosa. 1 Ho',,rE)Ver, it was not tactful of MacArthur 
to make this kind of trip without first informing Washington. 
i•1oreover, the fanfare attending his arrival gave the impres-
sion that he sympathized strongly with nationalist aims and 
policy, as he undoubtedly did. Chiang Kai-shek said, "The 
foundation for Sino-American military cooperation has been 
laid. n 2 This appeared as if the United States vJer<~ about to 
enter into a new Chinese civil war. President Truman S<lvl 
this as General NacArthur mt:tking, or at least interfering 
·vlitht foreign policy. He sent Averell Harriman to Tokyo, 
"to brief General M::tcArthur on what American foroign policy 
d t k ~ · t i h' ti ' n3 was, an o as rum · o mprove , 1s rung. 
On August 10th MacArthur issued a statement in which 
he said, with aggressive emphasis, that his visit to Formosa 
was limited entirely to military matters; and that Chinese 
domestic affairs ~vere altogether out of his own responsi-
bility and province. 
r4y visit, the General said, has been maliciously 
represented to the public by those who invariably, in 
the past have propap;andized a policy of defeatism and 
appeasement in the Pacific ••• which tend, if indeed 
1 John Gunther, 'I:he Riadle .2! MacArthur (New York: 
Harper and Brotherst 1950), P• 190. 
2 ~ •• pp. 195-96. 3 I,oc. cit. 
--
they are not designed, to promote disunity and destroy 
faith and confidence in the American nation and insti-
tutions and Americ~n representatives at this time of 
great world peril. 
12 
On August 28, 1950, another explosion between Presi-
dent •rruma.n and General MacArthur took place when a messa,:;e 
to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention at Chicago was re-
leased, in advance, to the press. An alert newspaperman got 
hold of it and called it to the attention of the White House. 
:President Truman ordered the message vii thdrawn from the con-
vention; however, it i'1ad already reached newspaper publica-
tion. It was published in the ~ York Times, on August 29. 
In this statement MacArthur said that Formosa was part of the 
new battle line that made the Pacific a peaceful American 
lake, that the western strategic frontier had shifted from an 
"exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, 
and Guam to the Philippines. n 5 'rhis, he held, vJas an av(mue 
of weakness along which w~ were subject to attack and had 
been attacked. Formosa in the hands of an enemy \>las to be 
compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tend-
er, strategically located, vlhich could be maintained at a much 
4 Gunther, 12£• £!!., PP• 195-96. 
5 u.s. Cong., Armed Services Committee, "Hearings Rel-
ative to the Facts and Circumstances Bearing on the Relief of 
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and on the American 
.Policy in the Far East," Militar.:~ Situation.!!! !!1! ~ ~· 
82nd Gong., 1st Sess., 1951, Part 5, p. 3478. 
13 
lower cost than its equivalent in aircraft carriers and sub-
marine tenders. ttNothing," he said, "could be more falla-
cious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate ap-
peasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend 
Formosa we alienate continental Asia." 6 
President Truman, in a fireside chat, then explained 
to the na·tion and the world, nwe do not want Ji'ormosa or any 
part of Asia for ourselves. We believe that the future of 
Formosa • • • should be settled peaceably • • • by interna-
tional action." 7 There could be read into MacArthur's 
statement an implied criticism of the neutralizing of For-
mosa. It was apparent that MacArthur had a talent for this 
sort of thing. Furthermore, many people believed that be-
cause of his experience and record of achievement, his opin-
ion was needed. President Truman's military experience was 
limited to that of an artillery captain in \Vorld War I. 
\'/hen MacArthur was Army Chief of Staff Marshall was a colo-
nel who had never had a field command. The contrast could 
not be overlooked by the press and the public. 
On September 12, 1950, Secretary of Defense Johnson 
resigned, effective September 19. General George Narshall, 
followinB a special act of Congress to make a military 
6 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3478. 
7 New York Times, April 15, 1951t "Chapters in Dis-
pute," p.E-1:--
14 
officer eligible for that post, became Secretary of Defense. 
The Wake Island meeting of Truman and MacArthur 
shocked almost everyone with its brevity. The communique 
that was drafted and initialed by both men was described by 
one reporter as an act that appeared "as if both men were 
heads of different governments."8 It stated: "a very com-
plete unanimity of view" prevailed in the discussions cover-
ing Korea, Japan, and United States policy in the Paoific.9 
After Inchon. military developments moved at an in-
creased tempo. On October 20, American troops captured 
Pyongyang, the North Korean capi tr:tl; the next day United 
States parachute troops landed deep inside North Korea. Then 
on October 28, Red Chinese elements were identified in North 
Korea.. 10 
On November 24, G-eneral Ma.cArthur launched an end-the-
war offensive \1hich, on November 27, ran into an attack by 
four Red Chinese armies that stalled and threw back the 
drive. On November 28, MacArthur said, wwe face an entirely 
new war" because of the intervention of the Red Chinese 
forces. 11 
8 Gunther, ~· £!!., p. 200. 
9 Hearings, Part 5, pp. 3571-73. 
10 Log. ill· 
11 ~ ~ Times, November 29, 1950. 
15 
These events led the New !.Q.tls Times reporter Arthur 
Krock to make the following inquiry of General MacArthur: 12 
Ans\vering critic ism for military action beyond Thirty-
eighth Parallel or .Pyongyang some officials here saying 
for non-attribution but for publication that every time 
such stop-point was suggested you replied you would not 
accept responsibility for security of your troops if de-
cision was made; that this faced authorities with dilem-
ma of taking risk replacing you with elections coming on 
or letting you proceed against their political and diplo-
matic judgment and against some high military judgments 
also. 
In reply General MacArthur sent the following mes-
sage: 13 
Reference query contained in your radio of the twenty-
ninth. There is no validity whatsoever to the anonymous 
gossip to which you refer. Every strategic and tactical 
movement made by the United Nations Command has been in 
complete accordance with United Nations resolutions and 
in compliance with the directives under which I operate, 
every lJ'l.ajor step having been previously reported and 
fully approved. 
I have received no suggestions from any authoritative 
source that in the execution of its mission the Command 
should stop at the Thirty-eighth Parallel or J.lyongyang, 
or at any other line short of the international boundary. 
To have done so would have required revision of the res-
olutions of the United Nations and the directives re• 
ceived in implementation thereof. 
It is historically inaccurate to attribute any degree 
of responsibility for the onslaught of the Chinese Com-
munists armies to the strategic course of the campaign 
itself. The decision by the Chinese Communist leaders to 
wage war against the United Nations could only have been 
a basic one, long premeditated and carried into execution 
12 New .I.Q!! 'fimes, December 1, 1950. 
· · Hearings, Part 5-, -P~ 3495. 
13 ~X£!! Times, December 1, 1950. 
Hearings, Part 5, p. 3496. 
16 
as direct result of the defeat of their satellite North 
Korean armies. Thanks for bringing this misleading 
anonymous gossip to my attention. 
Obviously there were political implications involved 
in this, and the political and military considerations over-
lapped each other. MacArthur was in a position to hold, 
with good reason, that his forces were not secure unless 
they crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel. Carrying the war 
to the enemy was no new military concept, and by doing so he 
protected his own forces. However, this brought the Chinese 
Communists into the war, and the sa~e reasoning applied to 
them. Beyond the Yalu River they could build up supplies of 
men and materiel. This was not acceptable to MacArthur. 
Nevertheless, our planes were not permitted to follow, even 
in hot pursuit across the Manchurian border. 
From this point on, the record indicates that Mac-
Arthur could not accept this concept of fighting a war, at 
least not this war. He probably arrived at this decision 
sometime earlier, but we are concerned with the events that 
took place and the reasons for them. He went over the heads 
of his superiors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Presi-
dent, and took his case to the people through the press and 
public statements. On December 1, 1950, in an interview 
>vii th reporters of th.e magazine !l..:..§.. ~ ~ World Report, 
the follo\ving questions and answers were made: 
Q. Are the limitations which prevent unlimited 
17 
pursuit of Chinese large forces and unlimited attack on 
their bases regarded by you as a handicap to effective 
military operations? 
A. An enormous handicap without precedent in mili-
tary history. 
Q. Nine out of ten persons on the street here and 
throughout the country are asking why the atom bomb is 
not being used. Can anything be said as to the effec-
tiveness of the bomb in the type of operation in which 
you are now engaged? 
A. My comment would be inappropriate at this time. 14 
On the same day MacArthur also sent a message to Hugh 
Bailliet President of the United Press, which said, in 
part: 15 
l''rom the initiation of the North Korean aggression 
against the Republic of Korea until the total defeat of 
the North Korean armies, support from the Communist 
Chinese from behind the privileged sanctuary of neutral 
boundaries was open and notorious and all-inclusive. 
On December 6, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ad-
vised MacArthur of a Presidential order, issued to all cab-
inet members and other top government officials, requiring 
the clearance of speeches, press releases, and other state-
ments concerning military policy and foreign relations. 
Military commanders and diplomatic representatives were 
directed to use extreme caution in public statements and 
to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign 
14 !h.§.. ~!World Report, December 8, 1950, p. 16. 
Hearings, Part 5, PP• 3532-33. 
15 l]!Q., PP• 3534-35. 
18 
policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media 
in the United States. 16 
By this time the controversy was front page news all 
over the nation. At a press conference on January 11, 1951, 
President Truman denied that there was any curb on Mac-
Arthur's authority to speak freely on the Korean War. At 
MacArthur's headquarters the directive was interpreted as 
applying solely to formal public statements and not to com-
muniques, correspondence, or personal conversations with 
others. 17 
Without the Chinese Cornmunists in the war North Korea 
was defeated, but the "new war" that MacArthur spoke of 
found the United Nation forces driven back to the vicinity 
of the Thirty-eighth Parallel. In :F'ebruary the General had 
this to say about holding the battle line at this point: 18 
The concept advanced by some that we should estab-
lish a line across Korea and enter into positional war-
fare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails com-
pletely to take into account the length of such a line 
at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is 
involved and the relatively small force which could be 
committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage in such 
strategy would insure destruction of our forces piece-
meal. Talk of crossing the Thirty-eighth Parallel at 
16 ~., P• 3536. 
17 u.s. News.~ World Report. "Faqts Behind the_M_ae_- __ 
Arthur-Truman Mix-up, '1 April 27, 1951, p. 15. 
18 New!£!! Times, February 14, 1951. 
Hearings, Part 5, p. 3539. 
the present stage of the campaign, except by scattered 
patrol action incidental to the tactical situation, is 
purely academic. 
19 
From a. military standpoint we must materially reduce 
the existing superiority of our Chinese Communist enemy 
engaging with impunity in undeclared war against us, 
with the unprecedented military advantage and sanctuary 
protection for his military potential against our 
counterattack upon Chinese soil, before we can seriously 
consider conducting major operations north of that ge-
ographic line. 
Judging from this statement one would think that the 
General felt he had two adversaries; one in Korea, and the 
other in \~lashington. 'l'his statement was obviously an at-
tempt to use his influence in order to fight the Chinese as 
he thought best. He apparently saw the handwriting on the 
wall, and opposed, in advance, ending the war at the Thirty-
eighth Parallel. However, this is not the kind of battle 
communique that gives the status of military operations as 
of a certain date. Even so, this statement was not to arouse 
as much controversy as later "communiques." 
On March 7, the United Nations troops recaptured 
Seoul for the last time. General MacArthur then made one of 
his most important statements on the Korean War, in part as 
follows: 19 
Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground 
forces and materiel to the Korean battle area, a con-
tinuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of 
19 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3450. 
~ !£r! Times, March 8, 1951. 
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counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our 
organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in 
time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. 
Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit 
the enemy more than it would ourselves. 
Vital decisions have yet to be made--decisions far 
beyond the scope of authority vested in me as the mili-
tary commander, decisions which are neither solely poli-
tical nor solely military, but which must provide on the 
highest international levels an answer to the obscurities 
which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red 
China's undeclared war in Korea. 
The New York Times said that State Department people 
were not exactly delighted with General MacArthur's use of 
the word "stalemate" and its implications of futility. They 
felt that the effort in Korea was exacting a price in cas-
ualties that the Chinese Government could not go on paying 
forever. 20 However, MacArthur's point was that it was the 
Chinese, and not the United States, who could afford the 
price in human life. 
In th~ United Nations most of the delegates inter-
preted the statement as an attempt to put pressure on the 
United Nations to authorize MacArthur to bomb Chinese supply 
bases and industries in Manchuria. The United States' rep-
resentative moved quickly to end such fears and said that 
MacArthur's statement should be viewed as an "analysis" and 
not a "recommendation." "Any recommendations to the United 
20 ~ !£!k Times, March 11, 1951. 
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Nations, 11 he said, "would come from Washington." 21 
This message also said a great deal more than the or-
dinary battle communique. By implication it criticized the 
United Nations for the "obscurities which becloud the un-
solved problems raised by China's entry into the war." The 
"vital decisions yet to be made" clearly blamed Washington 
and the United Nations for the lack of a clear-cut victory 
in Korea. The decision had been made. The United Nations 
and Washington did not wait from the date of the Chinese en-
try into the war in October, until March, when MacArthur 
made this statement, without having a plan of action. How-
ever, this plan was a negative one; it was based on the idea 
of containment, of limiting the war to Korea, and of not 
tru{ing the risk of spreading the war into China. 
In the United Nations the idea of unifying Korea by 
military action was quietly dropped. The General Assembly 
resolution of October 7, which tacitly authorized the cross-
ing of the Thirty-eighth Parallel by United Nations forces 
and the importance of unification of the whole country, was 
being pushed deeper into the background. 22 
The next phase of the controversy took place during 
the United Nations grinding offensive that slowly pushed the 
21 Ibid., "Atmosphere at the U.N.," p. E-1. 
22 New X2I! Times, April 15, 1951. 
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Chinese Communists back toward the Thirty-eighth Parallel. 
Intelligence reports indicated that the Chinese were massing 
in North Korea and Manchuria for a major drive. The four-
teen United Nations countries with troops in Korea were 
working for a statement of aims that would induce Nao 'l'se-
tung to consider a truce proposal. On March 20 1 1951, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General NacArthur the following 
message: 23 
State planning Presidential announcement shortly 
that, \vi th clearing of bulk of Sout.h Korea of aggres-
sion, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions 
of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that 
further diplomatic effort to\vard settlement should be 
made before any advance with major forces north of 38th 
Parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic 
reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. 
Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, 
~Jtate has asked JCS what authority you should have to 
permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks 
to provide security for U.N. forces and maintain contact 
with enemy. Your recommendations desired. 
Just four days later, March 24, without consulting 
\lla.shington, the General issued another in this unusual se-
ries of communiques. It is .f.illlazing in light of the March 20 
message of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, he had ap-
parently reached the limit of his patience. He noted that 
the Chinese "human wave tactics" had failed, and that Red 
China lacked the industry to fight a modern war. The com-
23 ~ .IQ.rk Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951. 
Hearings, Part :s, p. 3541. 
24 munique then stated: 
23 
The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware 
that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its 
tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea 
through expansion of our military operations to his 
coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to 
the risk of in~inent military collapse •••• 
Within the area of my authority as military comm;.).nder, 
however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at 
any time to confer in the field with the commander in 
chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find 
any military means whereby the realization of the polit-
ical objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which 
no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accom-
plished without further bloodshed. 
This message coupled an implied threat and an offer to 
discuss truce terms. The New York Times said the statement, 
"caused dismay and anger at the U.N. and in Washington." 25 
At the President's direction the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent 
General MacArthur a message which sternly called attention to 
the December 6, directive advising him and all other com-
manders to steer away from foreign and military policy state-
ments until they had been cleared by Washington. 
General Courtney Whitney, one of the men closest to 
MacArthur since the fall of the Philippines, later said: "The 
General has interpreted • • • his statement of March 24 • • • 
as dealing exclusively with the military situation and within 
24 New!£!! Times, March 24, 1951; reprinted 
April 12, 1951. 
Hearings, Part 5, pp. 3541-42. 
25 New York Times, April 15, 1951, p. E-1. 
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his uncontested authority to speak." 26 
Then on April 5, 1 951, the Minority Leader of the 
House of Representatives, Joseph Martin, read a letter to 
Congress from General MacArthur. This was a reply to a let-
ter from Congressman l•1artin. ·This exchange • and in particu-
lar 1'-iacArthur•s letter, furnish the climax in the dispute 
over our policy in Korea. 
Congressman Martin's letter, dated March 8, 1951; was 
as follows: 27 
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 
Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Command. 
My Dear General: In tho current discussions on for~ 
eign policy and overall strategy many of us have been 
distressed that ••• we have been without the views of 
yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Com-
round. 
I think it is imperative to tile security of our rqa-
tion and for the safety of the world that policies of 
tr1e United States embrace the broadest possible strategy 
and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe we not 
weaken our position in Asia. 
Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in 
Brooklyn, N.Y., February 12, stressing this vital point 
and suggesting that tl1e forces of Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek on li'ormosa might be employed in the opening of 
a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our 
forces in Korea. 
I have since repeated tile essence of thiB thesis in 
other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21, 
when J will be on a radio hook-up. 
I Hould deem it a great help if I could have your 
views on this point, either on a confidential basis or 
otherwise. Your admirers a.re legion, and the respect 
26 u.s.~~ World Report, April 27, 1951, P• 15. 
27 Hearings, Part 5, P• 3543; reprinted from the 
Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938. 
you command is enormous. May success be yours in the 
gigantic undert~{ing which you direct. 
Sincerely yours, 
25 
Joseph w. Martin, Jr. 
The reply of General filacArthur, March 20, 1951, 
read: 28 
Hon. Joseph w. Martin, Jr. 
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 
Dear Congressman Martin: I am most grateful for your 
note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of 
February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, 
and find that with the passage of years you have cer-
tainly lost none of your old-time punch. 
My views and recommendations with respect to the sit-
uation created by Red China's entry into war against us 
in Korea have been submitted to \vashington in most com-
plete detail. Generally these views are well known and 
clearly understoodt as they follow the conventional 
pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force as 
we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with 
respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on For-
mosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradi-
tion. 
It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that 
here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have 
elected to make their play for global conquestt and that 
we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; 
that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the dip-
lomats still fight with words; that if we lose the war 
to communism in Asia the fall of l!:urope is inevitable, 
win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet 
preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. 
There is no substitute for victory. 
With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial 
regard, I am, 
Faithfully yours, 
Douglas MacArthur. 
28 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3543. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BACKGHOUND OF THE HBARINGS 
How General MacArthur was fired. On the afternoon of 
- - .;;;,..;;..;;;...;;;....-
April 12, 1951 (Tokyo time), General and Mrs. MacArthur were 
just finishing lunch at the Embassy with a visiting United 
States Senator when the General's aide, Colonel Sidney Huff, 
telephoned for Mrs. MacArthur. A radio broadcast had just 
announced that the General had been relieved of all of his 
corumands. Colonel Huff knew that Mrs. MacArthur could help 
more than anyone else in this very awkward situation. A 
little later the official message from Washington was re-
ceived and delivered by the aide. It was dated April 10, 
1951 (Washington time), and read as follows: 1 
I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President 
and Commander in Chief of the United States military 
forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Pow-
ers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Com-
mander in Chief, Far East; ·and Commanding General, u.s. 
Army, Far East. 
You will turn over your commands, effective at once, 
to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to 
have such orders as are necessary to complete desired 
travel to such place as you select. 
My reasons for your replacement will be made public 
concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing 
order, and are contained in the next following message. 
The message explaining the President's action read: 2 
With deep regret I have concluded that General of the 
Army Douglas t4acArthur is unable to give his whole-
1 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3546. 2 ~ •• p. 3547. 
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hearted support to the policies of the United States 
Government and of the United Nations in matters per-
taining to his official duties. In view of the specific 
responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of 
the United States and the added responsibility which has 
been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have de-
cided that I must make a change of command in the Far 
East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of 
his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. 
Ridgway as his successor. 
Full and vigorous debate on matters of national pol-
icy is a vital element in the constitutional system of 
our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that 
military commanders must be governed by the policies and 
directives issued to t:wm in the manner provided by our 
lmvs and constitution. In time of crisis, this consid-
eration is particularly compelling. 
General MacArthur's place in history as one of our 
greatest commanders is fully established. The nation 
owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and 
exceptional service which he has rendered his country 
in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I 
repeat my regret at the necessi t;v for the action I feel 
compelled to take in his case. 
~ reaction .Qf ..:!ill.§. J2Ublic. The extent of the public 
reaction was enormous. In New York, Mayor Impelleteri an-
nounced that the city would honor the General with the tra-
ditional ticker tape parade. From Tokyo, General MacArthur 
cabled his acceptance of New York's honors. He also noti-
fied the Senate Armed Services Committee that he thought it 
"inappropriate" for him to appear as a witness while Con-
gress was considering an invitation to him to address the 
·Congress as a whole. He said he wanted to talk to Congress 
in ng~meral terms. n3 
3 ~!2.!:!f Times, April 15, 1951, p. E-1. 
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A large part of the press supported ivlacArthur', but it 
cannot be assumed that this was an accurate reflection of 
public opinion. However, the press does influence public 
opinion, and the attitude of the press is an important con-
sideration. The influential ma.gazine Time said of the sit-
uation:4 
Seldom had a more unpopular man :fired a more popular 
one. Douglas MacArthur was the personification of the 
big man • • • Harry 1'ruman was almost a professional 
little rnanj with admirers who liked his courage and 
critics who despised his faults. 
Howeverj an Associated Press survey of seventy-eight 
leading newspapers in all parts of the country showed this 
division of opinion: Truman right, thirty-eight; Trurru;m 
wrong, twenty-six; neutral- fourteen.5 
The ~ York 'l'imes reported that ne\vspaper comment 
·6 generally reflected the following major themes: 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
( 3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Civil vs. military control of policy. 
What world policy do we have? (a) Europe first ot, 
('b) Stop Communism in Asia now. 
The President's Asian policy; whether or not he 
has been Vf.teilln.ting. 
.F'ersonali ties. Is Truman doing his job? Is Mac-
Arthur a 'far-seeing statesman,' or a 'dangerous 
egoist?' 
Secretary of State Acheson's role and charges of 
'appeasement' of the United Nations and Com-
munist China. 
4 ~, April 23, 1951, p. 24. 
5 fu !.Q.r.!£ Times, April 15, 1951, P• E:-5. 
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Across the nation newspaper editorials generally took 
a pro-MacArthur and anti-Administration view. A survey by 
the~ .!..Q1j£ Times7 reported that the Philadelphia Evening 
Bulletin (Independent) said, "A general in the Orient could 
not be allowed to determine global policies in the light of 
facts. contacts, and consultations not available to anybody 
in Japan or Korea." In New York the Dail;y: ~(Independent) 
said, " ••• the entire Korean \var situation stinks to heav-
en," and thought it was MacArthur's duty to tell the American 
people all he knew about "little Harry Truman's police ac-
tion." The Minneapolis~ (Independent) called the Korean 
War a "tragic blunder," but warned against embracing Mac-
Arthur's policies. The survey showed the Cleveland News 
(Republican) holding, "In the hearts of Americans at this 
hour General MacArthur is the real conqueror, and a President 
of the United States had, by his ill judgment and compromised 
position, emerged defeated." In Dallas the Daill Times-
Herald (Independent-Democrat) agreed that MacArthur had to 
go, but said: "The enemies of freedom can sit complacently 
and smile at our confusion. 11 The New Orleans States (Inde-
pendent-Democrat) was most outspoken: "we could much better 
have lost the whole national Administration at Washington 
than this able commander, statesman, organizer, and leader." 
7 .!!U:J!., P• E-3· 
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The Pacific Coast was more sensitive to Asian developments 
than any other part of the country, and the public was 
shocked. However, there were many voices to support the 
President, and the press seemed more temperate than the pub-
lic, though editorials expressed great fears of disastrous 
consequences. The ~ Angeles Times (Republican) called the 
President's move "horribly bad judgment • • • the most pow-
erful nation in the world has listened to the mewlings of 
its impotent allies and has thrown in with the appeasers." 
The noted~~ Times political commentator. 
Arthur Krock, wrote: 8 
It is probably too muoh to expect the Republicans 
not to try to make a quick harvest of the sudden crop of 
popular anger, the potential of trouble and danger for 
the free world is large. 
Another Times writer, Hanson w. Baldwin, predicted that the 
change would result in smoother command and staff relation-
ships, and that the "Bataan crowd" would be replaced by Pen-
tagon direction.9 
Probably the person to whom the public reaction meant 
the most was the President. What did he expect the public 
reaction would be? The answer was given at the Blair House 
conference of April 10, which was the final meeting before 
MacArthur•s dismissal. There was a discussion of the prob-
8 ~ !2Ik Times, April 15, 1951, p. E-3. 
9 !£!g., P• E-4. 
able public reaction, a.nd the conferees anticipated there 
would be an uproar in Congress and that the first response 
from the public would be adverse. Nevertheless, President 
Truman observed, "If your decision is right you must go 
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ahead \vi th it even if you know there will be a storm of dis-
approval. If you are right, the Mnerican people will in 
time support you." 10 
Public reaction was all that the President and his 
advisers expected it would be. Arthur Krock wrote, "The 
dismissal inevitably projected General MacArthur onto the 
national political stage from a position in the wings. 1111 
Huge crowds turned out in Hawaii and San Francisco. An es-
timated 100,000 persons appeared before the San Francisco 
City Hall to hear the General say, "I have no political as-
pirations whatsoever. I do not intend to run for any polit-
ical office. I hope that my name will never be used in any 
political way. 1112 
In Washington, at President Truman's directive, all 
government departments and agencies dismissed :for the after-
noon all employees whose duties could be spared. About half 
a million people watched the welcoming events. The turn-
out in New York was twice as large as that which greeted 
10 ~., p. E-1. 11 ~., p. E-3. 
12 ~~Times, April 15, 1951, p. 1. 
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Genoral Eisenhower on his return from Europe. 
As of ,\pril 17, thH public response waa runni.ng 
<:l[;aim;t tho President insofar tM; Congressiond.l mai.l and tal-
ta.c tic wa.e to speaf( moru or hH~s f::.oftly cind hope that sucil a 
r~,.:;a.ction vJould. t~iko place. 13 
of public opinion, the ~ 
~ !!.m.~ reviewed foreign press statements. In t;ngland 
the !1ancl1ester Gug:u:ctia.p, after saying, H.Prosident Truman 
••• is wholly in tho ritsht," added ttu1t, "!~acA.rthur had at 
times been loft to take difficult decisions with a lamen-
table la,ok of pol! tica.l guidance from s ta.tesmon whose task 
it should have been to give it.'* The conservative Daj;li£ 
.B}f:nreaa took is!:me with the President's decision. Said the 
Expres~t "Is he [Gonera.l Hidgwai} also to be told by the 
lAake Success lollipops that he can do anything he wants. • • 
to the Chinese except hurt them"?" 14 Generally, though, the 
Hri tish people and government disagreed with HaoArthur. '.rhey 
opposed u.ny naval blockade of China because it would be in-
effective, and they felt that using the troopt.~ of Chiang Kai-
shek or bombing China would lead to atl extension of the wtar. 
13 ~ York Time§, April 17, 1951, p. 8. 
14 New ~ 'rimes, April 15, 1951, p. E-5. 
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Furthermore, they openly favored seating Red China in the 
United Nations. In the House ot Commons there was cheering 
at the announcement of General MacArthur's removal. 15 
In Rome, :F'oreign Hinister Count Carlo Sforza said the 
President had done "an excellent thing." The Netherlands 
government thought it a "wise" move. At the United Nations 
in New York there was polite but undisguised elation. The 
Indian delegation said: "It should improve the atmosphere." 
In Peiping a Chinese Communist paper wryly observed• "We do 
not see any significance in MacArthur's dismissal •••• 
One mad devil has lost favor with the boss and is being re-
placed vii th another." 16 
I.lli2, reaction 2!. Congress. Both Democrats and Repub-
licans joined in praising General MacArthur for his state-
ment that he did not intend to enter politics. Senator 
Wherry, Republican of Nebraska and Minority Leader of the 
Senate, said: 17 
This should put a stop to all the snipers and hatch-
etmen who have been dragging MacArthur politically into 
the great decision that must be made on what our na-
tional defense policy should be. 
Senator Johnson, Democrat of Colorado, said, "He can 
15 ~York Times, April 15, 1951, p. E-2. 
16 Loc. cit. 
--
17 ~York Times, April 19, 1951, p. 10. 
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now be regarded as a patriot instead of a politician."18 
House Minority Leader Martin said that the MacArthur 
statement was "no news to me," then added: "General Mac-
Arthur had previously told some of his friends he was not 
interested in politics. He is only trying to be of genuine 
service to the country • u19 
• • • 
Senator Lehman, Democrat of New York, said he was 
"glad that General MacArthur rejected any idea of engaging 
in political activity." 20 
Senator Benton, Democrat of Connecticut, said, "I 
congratulate him on his decision and I think this means 
he'll be even more influential." 21 
Republican Senator Ferguson of Michigan said that 
the announcement was just what he expected and that: 22 
Republicans here should not speak for General Mac-
Arthur, nor should he be spokesman for the party. 
Congress should get as many facts from him as possible 
to formulate proper policies. 
Meanwhile, on April 12, 1951, Senator Robert A. Taft, 
Republican party leader in the Senate, in a speech before 
.the Yale Engineering Association in New York, accused the 
President of usurping Congressional authority when he sent 
American troops into Korea without first getting approval. 
18 ~ !2!! Times, April 19, 1951, p.10. 
19 1&.9.· ill· 
22 1!£9.. ill· 
20 Loc. cit. 
--
21 1.2.9.. ill· 
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Furthermore, he noted that the President's position was not 
consistent, since the firing of MacArthur led the world to 
believe that we were "flirting with appeasement," while at 
the same time we were trying to prevent World War III by our 
move against Korean aggression. 23 
Other Congressional comment was in much the same 
vein -- pro-MacArthur from both Republicans and Democrats. 
Undoubtedly some of the Democrats were waiting for a turn in 
the tide of public opinion. It v1ould have been politically 
unwise to oppose it at this time. 
For a short time Republican House Leader Martin 
talked about impeachment. Senator Kerr, Democrat of Okla-
horna, accused the Republicans of dodging the real issue and 
said that if they believed the nation should follow Mac-
Arthur's policy they should submit a resolution expressing 
that as the sense of the Senate. Senator Humphrey, Demo-
crat of Minnesota, said, "The Republican Party has become 
the war party.n 24 The talk of impeachment was dropped. 
However, that did not mean the Republicans were going 
to abandon so much political ammunition. Within the ~arty 
itself a change of tactics was needed to insure support of 
Republicans in Congress. Eastern internationalists, like 
23 Sen. Robert A. Taft, "The Korean War and the Mac-
Arthur Dismissal," Vital Speeches, XVII No. 14, May 1, 1951, 
pp. 420-22. 
24 ~' April 23, 1951, P• 26. 
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Senator Lodge, and men like Senator Knovtland who wan ted de-
cisive action in Asia, as well as such isolationists as 
Indiana's Capehart and Illinois' Dirksen, who frequently 
criticized involvement in either Europe or Korea, were all 
needed for effective party unity. A Presidential election 
was coming up in 1952, and the firing of MacArthur seemed, at 
this time, to accrue to the benefit of the Republicans. As 
a result Representative Martin announced that the Republican 
Party would move to have MacArthur address a joint session 
of Congress. 
In addition to the Republican opposition in Congress 
the President had considerable opposition from within his own 
party. This came from Southern Democrats who took issue with 
the President's stand on civil rights and transferred this 
attitude into general opposition of his politics. 
On April 19, 1951, General MacArthur addressed a joint 
meeting of Congress. In this he was free to speak over the 
head of the President, but he had already done that. This 
was probably his greatest hour. The ~ Y2.!:!f Times head-
lined, "20 Million View General over TV." According to the 
Times, this was more than nwitnessed the Senate crime in-
vestigation." Furthermore, "viewers saw a man who not only 
had strong convictions, but also displayed an intuitive stage 
presence and a keen awareness of his dramatic hour." 25 
25 m 12.!:!£ Times, April 20, 1951, P• 6. 
Interest in the address was so great that many tele-
vision and radio stations changed their schedules to offer 
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repeat broadcasts on films and recordings. However, accord-
ing to the ~ 12!:!£ Times, "TV cameramen gave fine shots of 
Republicans applauding, but no direct, full-screen views of 
the Democrats just sitting quietly." The Times concluded 
that "both reportorial accuracy and dramatic contrast called 
for better judgment by the cameramen or directors."26 
The General's speech raised several questions and kept 
the dispute very much alive. He said that the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff had agreed with him. It followed that members of 
the Senate Armed Services Com..rni ttee would want to hear more 
about that. 
The demand f2! §U investigation £x Congress. Both 
parties agreed there should be an investigation of foreign 
policy. In addition to the immediate reason, brought on by 
the General's dismissal, there was the problem of troops for 
Europe--the so called "great debate" of 1950-51. In its 
broader aspects, this was a logical development of the dif-
ferences involved in the 11Europe first" policy of Roosevelt 
and Churchill in World War II, with which MacArthur had dis-
agreed.27 The final and probably the most pressing reason 
26 ~York Times, April 20, 1951, p. 6. 
27 ~ :F'orrestal Diaries, Walter Millis, editor (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 17-18. 
for an investigation was that intense public interest de-
manded it. These circumstances put Congress in a difficult 
position. In the first place it was the duty of Congress to 
investigate the situation since in involved the safety of the 
nation, hut a really objective analysis required that the in-
vestigators subordinate political considerations to national 
security. 
Of less vital importance, but not to be overlooked, 
v.ras the manner in which the General was dismissed. A Con-
gressional investigation was not needed to prove it had been 
bungled, but an explanation of it was in order. To many Re-
publicans it was typical of the way everything in Washington 
was being handled, and it contained all the elements of a 
political bombshell. 
Arrangements for the Hearings themselves had inter-
esting and important political overtones. The Democrats 
wanted closed hearings and wanted to use the standing com-
mi ttees on l1ili tary Affairs and Foreign Relations. ~ 
magazine said that the Democrats were anxious "to keep Gen-
eral MacArthur's thundering rhetoric out of the earshot of 
microphones and his dramatic profile off the screen of 
twelve million television sets." 28 Commenting on Time's 
28 Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Young, 1951)~.-r?s. 
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observation, Rovere and Schlesinger said that while 11m! was 
no doubt correct, » 
• • • the case did not rest entirely on 
the audio-visual delights of General MacArthur; it also 
rested on the same logic which holds that jewels should be 
kept in a safe." 29 After five votes a compromise was reached 
in which the Democrats yielded on procedure to the extent 
that the Hearings could be attended by all members of the 
Senate• v1ith questioning limited to committee members; there 
would be no broadcasting or televising, but an effort would 
be made to give the press whatever parts of the testimony the 
Defense Department could, in good conscience, release.3° 
29 ~·· p. 178. 30 12.£. ci~. 
CHAPTER IV 
FACTS ABOUT THE HEARINGS 
!h! Committee--~!!~ constituted. Sitting 
jointly, the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations brought together most of the principal leaders of 
both parties under the chairmanship of Senator Richard Rus-
sell, Democrat of Georgia. Representing the Armed Services 
Committee were: Senators Byrd• Democrat of Virginia; Hunt, 
Democrat of Wyoming; Johnson, Democrat of Texas and Majority 
Leader in the Senate; Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee; 
Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi; Long, Democrat of Louisi-
ana; Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire; Saltonstall, Re-
publican of Massachusetts; Morse, Republican of Oregon; 
Knowland, Republican of California; Cain, Republican of 
Washington; and Flanders, Republican of Vermont. Members of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations were: Senators Connally, 
Democrat of Texas and committee chairman; George, Democrat 
of Georgia; Green, Democrat of Rhode Island; McMahon, Dem-
ocrat of Connecticut; Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas; 
Sparkman, Democrat of Alabama; Gillette, Democrat of Iowa; 
Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin; Smith, Republican of New 
Jersey; Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa; Lodge, Republican 
of Massachusetts; Tobey, Republican of New Hampshire; and 
Brewster, Republican of Maine. This resulted in fourteen 
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Democrats and twelve Republicans. 1 
The extent to which politics entered into the com-
mittee's line of questioning is a matter of some speculation, 
but it was, nevertheless, a factor that must be studied and 
evaluated. While the committee had a Democratic majority, 
seven o:f them were Southern Dixiecrats. 2 On the other hand, 
Republican Senator Morse frequently split with his own party 
to support the Administration viewpoint. 
These two committees brought together two of the most 
important Congressional groups. Under their wing was con-
trol of the defense budget, about two-thirds of all federal 
expenditures, and the increasingly difficult problems of 
foreign affairs. The importance attributed to the work of 
these committees is indicated by the seniority of members 
assigned to them. Senator George was elected to the Senate 
in 1922; Senator Russell was elected in 1932; Senator Byrd 
was elected in 1933. Senator Knowland was being groomed to 
take over the Senatorial leadership of' the Hepublican Party. 
The Senator most conspicuous for his absence from these 
committees was Robert A. Taft, who preferred to devote 
himself to leading the Republican Party in Congress and to 
1 Heari!JBS, Part 1, P• ii. 
2 Senators: Russell, Georgia; Byrd, Virginia; John-
son, Texas; Stennis, Mississippi; Long, Louisiana; George, 
Georgia; Sparkman, Alabama. 
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domestic affairs. Senator Sparkman was to be the Democratic 
Vice-Presidential choice in 1952. Senator Morse was widely 
known as a liberal Republican. He had gained a considerable 
reputation on the West Coast as an arbitrator of labor dis-
putes. In 1943, Senator Fulbright introduced a resolution 
in the House of Representatives which called for "the cre-
ation of appropriate international machinery with power ade-
quate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting 
peace." 3 Subsequently, Senator Fulbright became Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A similar resolu-
tion was introduced in the Senate in 1943 by Senator Tom 
Connally; the combination of these became known as the Con-
nally-Fulbright resolution. 4 
How !h! Hearings ~ conducted. Because the testi-
mony concerned national security it was necessary that the 
Hearings be closed to the public. While neither the press 
nor the public was admitted, arrangements were made to give 
the press whatever testimony the Defense Department cleared. 
Of course, Defense Department censorship was not what the 
correspondents felt would result in the full coverage they 
wanted. According to Rovere and Schlesinger, most corre-
3 Richard B. Morris, editor, Encyclopedia 21 American 
History {New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 382. 
4 Loc. cit. 
--
spondents thought the system would be "unbearably clumsy," 
but it turned out to be 11 ••• the most thorough and accu-
rate coverage there has been of any Congressional hearing 
within memory."5 
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A subcommittee on Censorship was made up of Senators 
McMahon and Knowland with Admiral Arthur Davis representing 
the Defense Department. The censored transcripts were sent 
to the Senate Office Building press room ordinarily within 
an hour after the testimony had been given. Whenever the 
stenotypist in the hearing room had a few hundred words, his 
ribbon was taken to the mimeograph room, where the text was 
cut on a stencil. The stencil was then given to Admiral 
Davis with the advice of Adrian Fisher of the State Depart-
ment. Any material that would endanger national security 
was cut out with a razor blade. The mutilated stencil was 
put on an electric duplicating machine which, sheet by 
sheet, fed duplicates practically into the hands of the cor-
respondents, who had arranged to purchase them. The fee was 
twelve and a half cents a sheet, and for a time there was a 
brisk second-hand market at three cents a sheet. All told, 
there were a,ooo sheets. 6 
Chairman Russell had some difficulty keeping the bal-
5 Rovere and Schlesinger, £2• cit., p. 179. 
6 Ibid., p. 181. 
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ance that would protect national security and at the same 
time keep the American people well informed. He stated at 
the beginning of the Hearings that the transcript should be 
full and complete, and later he saidt "The American people 
are entitled to every single piece of information that can 
be safely spread on the public reoord." 7 However, he also 
noted that two press reports quoted unidentified Senators on 
evid.ence submitted to the committee which did not appear in 
the released transcript. At one point Senator Russell 
criticized General Marshall for having "put the classifi-
cation to practically all of your statements."8 It turned 
out, however, that only 3.8% of Marshall's testimQny was de-
leted, either by himself or the censors. This compared to 
1.4% of MacArthur's testimony.9 
When the Hearings had been going on for three weeks 
the New York Times observeda 10 
--
Our friends and adversaries all over the world have 
been able to listen to an exposition of our military and 
diplomatic strategy such as has never been put on record 
before by any other nation in history. 
"!!tt Commencing May 3, 1951, the Hearings lasted for seven 
weeks, ending June 27, 1951. Over two million words of 
7 Hearings, Part 1, p. 682. 
8 Ibid., P• 335. 9 ~., P• 678. 
10 Cited in Rovere and Schlesinger,~.£!!., p. 181. 
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testimony were taken from thirteen witnesses. 11 In an en-
deavor to make the Hearings non-partisan, the members of the 
joint committee decided that no views or conclusions would 
be stated as that of the majority or minority, but that the 
committee members could file their own views and conclusions 
with the Chairman. Such views were printed in the 
12 appendix. 
The most controversial matter relating to procedure 
that arose after the Hearings were underway occurred when 
witnesses declined to answer on the grounds that the ques-
tions disturbed the confidential position of an adviser to 
the President. MacArthur was asked what transpired during 
the private talk at Wake Island; he declined to answer and 
was not challenged. General Marshall also declined to an-
swer confidential questions about the President and himself 
and was not challenged. Bradley was questioned about a con-
ference between the President, General Marshall, General 
Bradley, Secretary Acheson, and Mr. Harriman concerning the 
dismissal of MacArthur, and he declined to answer for the 
same reason. In this case, however, there were several 
strong objections from Republicans Wiley and Hiokenlooper. 
Arguments in favor of Bradley's stand were: (1) it involved 
11 Hearings, Part 5, p. 3567. 
12 Ibid., P• 3559. 
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a confidential relationship like lawyer-client and doctor-
patient, and (2) the separation of powers of the government. 
The principal arb~ment against Bradley's position was that 
this was public business. Chairman Russell ruled that 
Bradley was not required to testify to this point, and Sen-
ator Wiley appealed the ruling to a vote of the Committee. 
The ruling of the Chairman was sustained by a vote of eieht-
een to eight. Senators voting to uphold the ruling \IJere: 
George, Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Smith, Lodge, Connally, 
Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, I.,ong, Saltonstall, 
Morse, and Flanders. Senators voting a.gainst the ruling 
were: Fulbright, Gillette, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Brewster, 
Bridges, Knowland, and Cain. Senator Russell ruled that as 
Chairman he should not vote on his own ruling. 13 
The witnesses~ appeared before 1h! Committee. 
General MacArthur was, of course, the principal witness. His 
military career was long and distinguished, though like his 
father before him he quarreled with civilian authorities. As 
military governor of the Philippines, Major General Arthur 
MacArthur disagreed with Governor General William Howard Taft 
concerning the degree of civil government that should be 
granted the Philippines. Arthur MacArthur was in command of 
13 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 870-73. 
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the American forces during the Philippine revolt and did not 
agree with Judge Taft that the Philippine people were ready 
for civil government. Since politics were involved in this 
situation, part of Taft's job was to get the revolt off of 
the front pages of the newspapers as quickly as possible. 14 
Douglas MacArthur's military career was outstanding 
from the day he entered West Point. He graduated in 1903, 
the top man of his class. In \1orld War I he was chief of 
staff of the Forty-second (Rainbow) Division; then as com-
mander of the Eighty-fourth Infantry Brigade fought in the 
Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne defensives, and in the Saint-
i4ihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. In 1918 he was pro-
Inoted to the rank of brigadier general, and in 1919 was ap-
pointed Superintendent of West Point. From 1922-25 he was in 
command of the United States forces stationed in the Philip-
pines. This was followed by assignment as chief of the gen-
eral staff, 1930-35. In the period of Japanese expansion 
President Franklin Roosevelt (1935) appointed MacArthur head 
of the American military commission to the Philippines. The 
purpose of the commission was to establish an extensive 
training and defense plan for the Philippine Army. 
Although he had retired from duty in 1939, he returned 
to duty in July 1941 to command the United States armed 
14 Hunt,~·£!!., pp. 27-29. 
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J forces in the Far East. After the Japanese attack on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, he led the American resistance in the Philip-
pines until March 1942, when President Roosevelt ordered him 
to Australia to take comrnand of the Allied forces in the 
Southwest Pacific. From here and New Guinea he directed the 
campaign that ultimately led to the liberation of the Philip-
pines. In December 1944, he was promoted to general of the 
army--five star general--the army's highest rank. With this 
rank goes full pay for life, since he is considered to be on 
permanent call. After the surrender of Japan, MacArthur was 
named Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) occu-
pation forces. 15 He was seventy years old when he became the 
United Nations Commander in Korea. 
\vhen he ordered the dismissal of MacArthur, President 
Truman was well aware that he was dealing with a popular hero 
and an explosive political situation. Consequently he did 
not act until he felt there was no other alternative. Even 
so, he did not have an easy time of it. This was partly be-
cause the Korean War was an unpopular war at home, and partly 
because of the inept way the General was dismissed; but prob-
ably the chief difficulty lay in the character and person-
ality of Douglas MacArthur. In addition to his soldierly 
qualities, he has been an eloquent and effective public 
15 ~/illoughby, .21!• ill•, P• 300. 
speaker. In 1950, John Gunther wrote: 16 
A five star general can pretty well make his own 
rules, and nobody has ever excelled MacArthur in his 
capacity to tear the guts out of a directive, but by 
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and large he is scrupulously careful to maintain military 
proprieties. 
Politics were not the only extraneous factors that 
were involved in the Hearings; so too were the personalities 
of the individuals concerned with these times and events. 
The careers of Generals Marshall and MacArthur had crossed 
and rivaled each other for many years. At the time that Mac-
Arthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander in the Orient each 
was a five star general. Each had served under the other, 
but at the crucial hour Marshall was Secretary of Defense. 
Marshall came to the Army from Virginia Military Institute; 
he was commissioned in 1902. In World War I, \·lhen MacArthur 
led the Rainbow Division to famous victories, Marshall was an 
organizer, administrator, and planner of battles. He became 
aide-de-camp to General Pershing. At the end of the \<far each 
held the rank of colonel, but postwar reshuffling of rank 
brought l\1arshall down to a captaincy while MacArthur became a 
brigadier general. 
During the years that MacArthur was Superintendent at 
West Point, Commander at Manila, Commanding Officer of the 
Fourth Corps Area, and finally Chief of Staff and a full gen-
16 Gunther, QE• £11., p. 15. 
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eral, Marshall continued service with Pershing. There were 
assignments in China and long tours in the Army's schools as 
a student or instructor. Marshall knew that he would have to 
have some field assignments to attain any real advancement. 
In 1932 and 1933 he was given duty with troops, but the as-
sigmnent was interrupted with orders to the Illinois National 
Guard as inspector and instructor. 17 Marshall was bitterly 
disappointed. He took the unusual step of requesting the 
Chief of Staff to assign him field duty, but he was ordered 
to carry out the original assignment to the National Guard. 
MacArthur was Chief of Staff at the time. From this time on 
there was bad feeling between them, but it cannot be said to 
have influenced their military decisions. 
After MacArthur's tour as Chief of Staff ended in 
1935, Marshall rose rapidly. In 1939 he became Chief of 
Staff and a four star general, just in time to plan and carry 
out America's great rearmament drive. When World War II 
started for the United States, Marshall was in command at the 
Pentagon, and MacArthur was at Manila. The two Generals dis-
agreed on strategy for the prosecution of the war. Since 
there was not enough equipment for a full-scale war in both 
Europe and the Pacific, there had to be a division. Europe 
was given first call, and the Pacific had to wait. MacArthur 
17 U.s.~ & World Report, May 11, 1951, PP• 30-32. 
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made no secret of his impatience. 
After the war Marshall retired from the Army, but, 
like MacArthur, when he was needed by the government he con-
tinued to serve. President Truman sent him to China to try 
to bring about a truce in the Chinese civil war. The truce 
did not materialize, and in a year Marshall came to doubt the 
value of Chiang, his men, and his administrators. 
After his return from China Marshall became Secretary 
of State for two years. He stressed the Europe-first policy 
with the Marshall Plan, shut off aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and 
pigeonholed the Wedemeyer Report that urged continued help to 
Chiang. MacArthur's views were passed over. 18 
After the invasion of South Korea, Marshall was again 
called from retirement to become Secretary of Defense. Thus 
the quiet and unassuming Marshall had kept pace with the 
brilliant and dramatic MacArthur throughout their long ca-
reers. The personal characteristics that made the differ-
ences between them were reflected in the methods that they 
used and in the objectives they advocated. 
One of the most controversial figures of President 
Truman's cabinet was Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Right-
ly or v1rongly he was a. constant target of the opposition. In 
defense of his Secretary of State, President Truman had this 
18 .lll.!,g.' p. 33. 
to say: 19 52 
History, I am sure, will list Dean Acheson among the 
truly great Secretaries of State our nation has had. 
Most of the criticism came from members of the Senate 
sometimes called the "China First" bloc. 
These men kept repeating the completely baseless 
charge that, somehow, Acheson had brought about the 
Communist victory in China, and they now charged that it 
was Acheson who was depriving General MacArthur of the 
means of gaining victory. 
Graduated from Groton, Yale University, and Harvard 
Law School, Acheson was given an education that very few 
people could obtain. Consequently, it was not surprising to 
find that the ~· ~ ~ World Report found this back-
ground had set him apart from many in Congress with whom he 
had to dea1. 20 This, however, did not impair his standing 
,with the President. It is interesting because the back-
grounds of Truman and Acheson were so different. 
In his dealings with other people, Acheson unfortu-
nately had a flair and a weakness for withering phrases when 
the questions revealed a lack of knowledge or slowness to 
understand his viewpoint. At one point in the Hearings Sen-
a tor J!,landers said that Mr. Acheson "was using his 'papa 
kno\vs best' style to a bad advantage. 1121 No doubt some of 
this was politics, and would have happened to anyone who was 
19 ~magazine, February 13, 1956, p. 71. 
20 !!.:..2.• ~,?!World Report, June 15, 1951, p. 34. 
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Secretary of State at the time. Since the end of World 
1 War II the State Department had increased greatly in impor-
tance. It could not move without getting strong reactions, 
both favorable and unfavorable. In the postwar period Na-
tionalist China fell to the Communists. Hany people in the 
United States were very critical of the roles played by both 
Acheson and Marshall. Marshall was sent to China when Ambas-
sador Hurley resigned, with instructions to try to bring 
about a coalition government in which Chiang Kai-shek would 
permit Communists in both the government and the army of Na-
tionalist China. The result was that the Republicans were 
able to mark him as the symbol of United States difficulties 
in the Far East. Five years previously China was in friendly 
hands, then it fell into the hands of a shooting enemy. 
Besides these knotty problems, Senator McCarthy's charges of 
communists in the State Department created additional trou-
ble.22 
Relations between MacArthur and Acheson had been 
strained since 1945. MacArthur had announced that within six 
months after the occupation of Japan started, a reduction of 
forces from the original estimate of 500,000 to 200,000 could 
be made. At a press conference Acheson countered with, 
"· •• the occupation forces are instruments of policy and 
22 Ihi£., p. 32. 
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not determinants of policy ••• and whatever it takes to 
carry this out will be used 11 23 • • • • 
During World War II, Franklin Roosevelt was in many 
respects his own Secretary of State, but after his death that 
office again became the real source of American foreign pol-
icy, subject to Presidential approval. Acheson became Under 
Secretary in 1945 for Secretary of State James Byrnes. The 
opponents of the Truman Administration, Republican and Demo-
crat, vJere able to link Acheson with a group of ul tra-liber-
als then working in the State Department. According to 
Frazier Hunt, it was he who assigned John Carter Vincent as 
head of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department. 
Acheson also made John Ste'wart Service head of the State De-
partment Information Service. In addition, the fact that 
Alger Hiss and Owen Lattimore were State Department men was 
condemned. 24 
The truth was that the Republican campaign against 
Acheson, fairly or not, marked him as the symbol of the dif-
ficulties of the United States in the Far East. He had be-
friended Hiss, but so had John J?oster Dulles and ]'elix Frank-
furter. Acheson became something of a political albatross 
to the Democrats. As a matter of fact many Republicans con-
23 Hunt, .212• .£ll., PP• 411-12. 
24 ~., PP• 415-16. 
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sidered him a political asset to their cause. 25 However, on 
the stand Acheson was to be coldly logical, calm, and unemo-
tional. He had a lawyer's skilled command of himself, and 
was exceedingly careful not to be clever, apparently real-
izing that a debater's victory often costs more support than 
it wins. 
The principal military advisers of the President were, 
of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their function was 
twofold: they advised the President on military matters, and 
each was administrator of his respective branch of the armed 
forces. They were necessarily concerned with the balance of 
forces needed to protect us and our friends from Soviet 
aggression. The disposition of our forces became the subject 
of much Congressional controversy in 1951. The question was 
not so much what to do, but how to do it. There was and is 
an area here where military and foreign policy overlap, and 
this was the crux of the MacArthur controversy. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were made up of General Omar 
Bradley, Chairman; General J. Lawton Collins, Army; General 
Hoyt s. Vandenberg, Air Force; and Admiral Forrest Sherman, 
Navy. General Bradley enjoyed a very considerable reputa-
tion. During World War II, he was in the African and Sicily 
campaigns; in 1944 he led the United States First Army in-
25 ~·~!World Reuort, June 15, 1951, pp. 32-34. 
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vasion of Normandy; and in 1944, was placed in command of the 
newly created Twelfth Army Corps, in which position his 
skillful planning hastened the defeat of Germany. From 1945-
48 he was head of the Veterans Administration. In 1948, he 
replaced General Eisenho~tJer as Army Chief of Staff and in 
1949, became the Chairman of the newly formed Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Senator Russell described him as a man of "great 
humanity and great humility; the GI's general. 1126 In his 
testimony, Secretary Marshall noted that Bradley had com-
manded, in the field, the largest force of ground troops in 
history, his experience was very extensive, he was level-
headed, and a man of great honesty of purpose. 27 
Admiral Sherman, the N'avy•s representative to the 
Joint Chiefs, was well known as a brilliant strategist, and 
the one who had perhaps the most complete knowledge of world 
affairs and geopolitics. He had been Admiral Nimitz's Deputy 
Chief of Staff in the Pacific campaign of ivorld War II, and 
had been in comrnand of the Mediterranean Fleet. The result 
was a first-hand knowledge of both the European and Pacific 
theaters of military operations. 
In World War II General Collins vias in the fighting at 
Guadalcanal and in Europe. His forces seized Cherbourg in 
the first large capture from the Germans after the African 
26 Hearings, Part 2, p. 121. 27 Ibid., p. 501. 
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campaign. According to General Marshall, "he conducted a 
classic battle, which received almost no publicity in this 
country, in destroying large portions of the two armies re-
. . f th G t M i u28 ma1n1ng o e ermans a a nz • • • • 
Marshall felt that the combined experience of this 
group was such that he doubted if the Government would ever 
again be able to match it at one time in the Chiefs of 
Staff. 29 
The commit tee decided to go beyond those v1ho were di-
rectly concerned with MacArthur's dismissal and to investi-
gate the whole military situation in the Far East. Only in 
this way, they felt, could they understand MacArthur's 
position. General Albert Wedemeyer's knowledge and experi-
ence were called upon for this purpose. During the earlier 
years of World War II, he served as Chief of the Strategy and 
Policy Section of the Operations Division of the Army General 
Staff. In 1943 he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the South-
east Asia Command. In 1944 he was sent to China to assume 
command of the United States Forces in the China theater. 
There he also served as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek. He was author of the famous '1'iedemeyer Re-
port on China. 
In March 1949, I,ouis Johnson succeeded James Forrestal 
28 ~., P• 501. 29 I!££. ill· 
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as Secretary of Defense. He held the rank of Colonel and was 
a past National Commander of the American Legion from 1932-
33. During the Hoosevelt Administration Johnson was Assist-
ant Secretary of War and served as Roosevelt•s special rep-
resentative to the l!'ar East. In the latter position, he held 
senior diplomatic authority in that part of the world.30 He 
served as Secretary of Defense until September 1950, when he 
was succeeded by General Marshall. 
As the Hearings proceeded, the length of the investi-
gation became the subject of increasing concern to the Com-
mittee. The function of a Congressional investigation is, of 
course, to gather the information that will enable Congress 
to pass legislation, and to check upon the functioning of the 
Executive branch of the government. A subcommittee was ap-
pointed to consider the number of additional witnesses that 
should be called to testify. Thirty-four names were formally 
suggested, and a much larger number vms mentioned informally. 
By the eighteenth of June there was considerable need for 
ending the Hearings as soon as practicable, since t\ven ty-six 
Senators had taken time out from the work of the Senate as a 
whole, and it had suffered as a result of this loss of time. 
~urthermore, the work of other committees was diverted in 
order to proceed as rapidly as po_§~ibl~ with the MacArthur 
30 Hearings, Part 4, p. 2570. 
59 
controversy and our far-eastern policies.31 The main consid-
eration in selecting witnesses was that the Committee should 
become well informed and hear from both sides of the issue, 
while at the same time preventing the testimony from becoming 
repetitive in character. Averell Harriman was contacted and 
said that he v!Ould be glad to testify, but that he would not 
have anything to add to \vhat had been covered by previous 
witnesses; as a result he was not called. Finally, the sub-
committee tried to balance the number of witnesses presenting 
views that were in conflict with the Administration and vice 
versa, but at the same time limiting the list of those to 
testify to persons "who had some direct relation with the 
events and policies under investigation."32 
By the time the subcormnittee looked into the matter of 
the witnesses to be called, the pro-administration witnesses 
who had given testimony were: General Marshall, Secretary 
Acheson, General Bradley, Admiral Sherman, General Vanden-
berg, and General Collins; the witnesses who generally 
opposed the Administration were: Generals MacArthur and 
v/edemeyer, and former Defense Secretary Louis Johnson. At 
this point the subco~~ittee recommended that the full com-
mittee invite and hear: Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Vice 
Admiral Oscar Badger, Major General David Barr, and 
31 I£!S., Part 4, P• 2716. 32 Ibid., p. 2719. 
1 60 
~ 
,j Patrick J. Hurley, Major General, Honorary Reserve, United ~ 
~ States Army. Three of these witnesses were thought not to 
be friendly to the Administration. They were: General 
O'Donnell, Admiral Badger, and Patrick Hurley. O'Donnell 
was invited to testify at the specific request of Senator 
Knowland.33 
General O'Donnell was introduced to the committee as 
ttone of our top Air Force commanders." In World War II he 
led the first squadron of B-17 Flying Fortresses across the 
western Pacific. When World War II was two days old he 
earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for an attack on a 
Japanese cruiser and destroyer escort under unusually haz-
ardous conditions. Later he commanded the Seventy-third 
Bomb Wing (B-29), and led it on the first Superfortress at-
tack made on Tokyo. From July 1950 to January 1951, he was 
in command of the Far Eastern Air Force Bomber Command.34 
When he appeared before the committee, Admiral Badger 
was the United States Navy Commander of the Eastern Sea 
Frontier. He had been on duty in the Far East over three 
years, and for another three years had gone there every six 
or seven weeks on various assignments. He testified that, 
at the end of the war, he had charge of the demobilization 
and closing up of Pacific bases, and went to China fre-
33 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2720-25. 34 Ibid., p. 3061. 
61 
quently in connection with the shipping and disposition of 
surplus material that was left on the islands of the Pacif-
ic. Exclusive of the MacArthur area of command, he was the 
representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Far East 
in the western Pacific.35 
General David G. Barr had considerable experience in 
the area of the committee's interest. He was Chief of the 
Army Advisory Commission in Nanking from January 1948 until 
he assumed command of the Seventh Infantry Division in Japan 
in May 1949. He led this Division at the Inchon landings in 
Korea. He held several of the country's highest decora-
tions, including the Silver Star, the Distinguished Service 
Medal, and the Distinguished Service Cross.36 His assign-
ments with the Army Advisory Commission were during the time 
that General Marshall was endeavoring to arrange a coalition 
government of the Chinese Nationalists and Comrnunists. Gen-
eral Wedemeyer was opposed to this plan and was to describe 
General Barr to Defense Secretary Forrestal as a "polite and 
a loyal, good officer, but most entirely lacking in force.u37 
General Patrick Hurley of New Mexico devoted his life 
to the service of his country. From 1912-17 he was the 
United States attorney for the Choctaw Indian Nation. Dur-
35 Xbid., Part 4, p. 2727. 36 ~., P• 3061. 
37 Forrestal Diaries.~· cit., p. 383. 
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ing World War I he fought in France as a colonel in the 
Army. In 1929 he was Undersecretary, and from 1929-33 he 
was Secretary of War in the Hoover Administration. As Sec-
retary of War, he obtained the appointment of General Mac-
Arthur as Chief of Staff over the objection of General 
Pershing. 38 
In introducing General Hurley to the committee, Sen-
ator Russell observed that he had played a key role in the 
events which were under study by the committee; that he had 
served as Ambassador to China from November 30, 1944 to No-
vember 27, 1945, and that these were some of the most sig-
nificant months involved in the committee's investigation.39 
General Hurley was first sent to China in 1944 as 
President Roosevelt's personal representative to help calm 
the bitter antagonism that existed between Chiang Kai-shek 
and "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. This personal feud had an im-
portant bearing on the course of events in China and was an 
important factor in the ultimate fate of Chiang Kai-shek. 
In the war against Japan, Stilwell insisted upon using all 
the forces of China, including the Communists. After years 
of fighting the Japanese, the Nationalists were weakened to 
the point where resistance to Mao Tse-tung's armies was not 
3~ Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1956), pp. 101=02. 
39 Hearings, Part 4, P• 2827. 
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strong enough to command effective control of the government 
of all China. The United Jta.tes government had furnished 
Chiang Kai-shek a great deal of military aid in both equip-
ment and military personnel. However, much of the equipment 
was lost in the black market of China. Stilwell's main 
theater of action was Burma, but thn United Sta.tes wanted 
him placed in field command of all Chinese forces. A long 
history of foreign domination did not endear Chiang Kai-shek 
or any other Chinese to this idea, but Stilwell was an im-
possible pill for Chiang to swallow. The result for Hurley 
v1as that he personally became well acquainted with the po-
litical situation in China. He was in the middle of the 
struggle for control of China that took place between the 
Japanese, the Communists, the .British, French and Dutch co-
lonial intt-Jrests, and the Nationalist forces of Chiang. 
~ lli Committee hoped 1£ accomplish. The relief 
of General fviacArt.hur and the Congressional Hearings that 
followed dramatized some of tho aspects of the question of 
the role of the military in making government policy on the 
highest level. 
One of these problems concerned the most effective 
and economical operation of the j)efense Department. The in-
creasing importance of t.he military establishment in the 
formulation and execution of national policy had become an 
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important political and social problem. For the United 
States this was essentially a new problem, and the tradi-
tional American values and institutions in the field of 
civil-military relationships faced new challenges. In this 
situation some Congressmen expressed fears of the development 
of a Prussian-type general staff in this country. The unifi-
cation of the armed forces is one illustration that was held 
up as an example. On the one hand, there were those Con-
gressmen who were alarmed at the inefficiency and lack of 
agreement among the top military command; and on the other 
hand, there were those who felt that the nation was being in-
doctrinated with some form of creeping militarism. The fact 
that, since World War II, the budget for national defense was 
about tvJO-thirds of the total national budget seemed to con-
firm this notion. That the United States had acquired ~new 
role in world affairs was not accepted or not understood in 
the minds of these people. 
Certainly part of the reason for the Hearings was the 
examination of the role of the military in making and execut-
ing foreign policy. It is obvious that foreign policy is, to 
a degree, contingent upon the military power necessary to 
back up international commitments and to protect our national 
status. This is not to say that military factors are the 
only elements involved in making foreign policy. For Con-
gress, however, the task would seem to have been clear-cut: 
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a definite investigation of the military problems involved in 
the Far East, and what conditions must prevail to maintain 
the principle of civilian supremacy in our newly acquired 
role of leadership and responsibility in the world. 
The traditional role of the military in the United 
States is subordinate to the civil authorities, the President 
and Congress. The President is, of course, the Commander in 
Chief of the armed forces, but a declaration of war must be 
approved by Congress. The civilian attitude toward the rnili-
tary has been one of suspicion, distrust, and sometimes 
positive disJ.ike. 40 The history of many nations is but a 
cataloguing of tyrannical governments established by the use 
of military power. Many Americans, mistakenly or not, view 
the actual attitudes and values of military men as inimical 
to freedom and democracy. In vie\v of this it seems incon-
sistent for Americans to have elected military heroes Presi-
dent six times. Hov1ever, in such men many governments have 
hoped to find national security. 
The machinery of the executive branch of the govern-
ment did not provide the means through which advice of high 
ranking officers could be directly available to the President 
unless he requested it. However, in this investigation, the 
40 Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, ~ ~ Qf 
!!'.!!1 Militar;)!; ill American }"oreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 3. 
committee decided to hear not only from the Secretary of 
Defense, but also from the top ranking military officers 
directly. 
Senator Russell opened the Hearings by stating that 
the committee would "attempt to obtain facts which are 
necessary to permit Congress to make correct decisions in 
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the problems of war and peace in the Far East and throughout 
the world."41 He agreed with General MacArthur in his 
speech to Congress, that the issues were beyond the realm of 
partisan considerations. 42 This established a very general 
objective for the committee, but so general that the problem 
of defining just what the real issues were became the sub-
ject of considerable controversy. 
The problem of limiting the issues was to pursue the 
committee all during the Hearings. Senator Wiley, very 
early in the investigation, said, "To me we can clear away a 
lot of maze and fog if we know just what the issues are."43 
However, Senator Russell countered with the observation, 
"The Chair does not want to prescribe the limitations of 
this hearing.n44 He then suggested that a subcommittee 
could be appointed to define the issues. However, no limi-
tations were established except to set time limits for the 
41 ~., Part 1, p. 1. 42 ~.,Part 1, p. 2. 
43 !hi£., Part 1, p. 35. 44 ~., Part 1, p. 36. 
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questioning of witnesses. Senator Wiley said that he wanted 
to know why MacArthur was fired and so did the public. 
:::ince there was no legislation before the committee, 
it was almost inevitable that the questions would become in-
volved with policy that was not related to the removal of 
MacArthur. Examples of this were: the China lobby, steps 
taken to prevent the loss of Iran to Soviet Russia after 
World War II, atom bomb development in 1945, Communists in 
the State Department, and the China situation. It is obvi-
ous that much of this had political implications. Further-
more, the Korean War did not bring the kind of response from 
the nation that followed Pearl Harbor in 1941. 
Other points of issue for the committee were: (1) 
\vhether MacArthur had exceeded his au·thori ty; (2) who was 
right and who was wrong with respect to the prosecution of 
the war, and (3) the reasons for the awkward manner of the 
dismissal of the General. 
In order to place the investigation above partisan 
politics, the committee decided that no views or conclusions 
would be set forth as that of the majority or minority, but 
that members would be permitted to file their views and con-
clusions with the Chairman, and that they would be printed 
in the appendix. It seems that the magnitude of the issues 
was such that the committee should have taken a stand and 
submitted a report of the whole committee. It would seem 
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that the public would be entitled to this much, especially 
since very few people would ever go into the situation to 
the extent that was done by the committee. Furthermore, as 
a result, some of the legislators were able to go uncom-
mitted on one of the most important and controversial issues 
of the day. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CASE FOR MacARTHUR 
The testimony of General Mac.Arthur. The General's 
speech to the Congress had been an impressive prologue to the 
Hearings. It had left, however, some questions that needed 
further clarification from MacArthur, and there was the Ad-
ministration point of vievl to be heard. This chapter deals 
with the witnesses at the Hearings who were friendly to the 
General. MacArthur was the first witness to appear before 
the committee. 
Just as there were witnesses friendly to each side of 
the case, there were those on the commit tee vi hose questions 
were designed to favor the General and those whose questions 
favored the Administration. However, the questions, the 
demeanor, and the attitude of the members of the committee 
were respectful and generally friendly, even when they took 
the side of the Administration. However, to have been 
otherv1ise would have been po.li tically unwise at that time. 
Yet much, and perhaps all, of the respect shown MacArthur 
was because of his service to the nation. 
Following world vJar II efforts were made to bring 
about greater efficiency in the armed forces through unifica-
tion of certain military functions. One of the first points 
brought out by MacArthur was an ob~:;ervation that there 
•.vas, in Korea, "very complete 11 cooperation between all 
branches of the service. 1 
The testimony tilen developed the Soviet choices of 
action in Korea. MacArthur indicated thz t he thought thu.t 
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Soviet military decisions were made on a Global basis rather 
then by the incident~> occurring in Korea; that their planning 
was based on broader considerations than one ceoeraphic area. 
Their pl::ms; he felt, \vere flexible, and the hi;;;h couJm<n-ld 
represented a high degree of mili tnry efficiency .• 
Then proceeding to matters more directly concerned 
wi tl1 the d:lS})Ute between MacArthur ;:md the Trum: n i\dmin-
L3 tr;t tion, he was asked hO\<: mr;ny grouw. troops \vere needed 
to accomplish the mission in Korea. To this the General re-
plied Uk t he h.'J.d const;mtly asked for more troops than he 
~was :).ven, but that he was unable to say ho\> llL·rl.Y troops 
were re,,uired because he was not; permitted to prevent trw 
enemy build-up of men and supplies in Manchuria. "If this 
restriction were removed," he said, "I do not believe it 
would t~ e a very great addition&l component of ground 
troops to wind this thing up. 112 
The question of the timing of MacArthur's recommen-
dation to carry on rur operations over Hanchuria and to 
blockade the coast of China was raised. He said that this 
1 Hearinr;s,, Part 1, pp. 4-5. 2 Ibid., p. 10. 
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WEl.i:5 not done· until after the entry of the Chinese Communists 
into the war. 3 The air operations he had in mind consisted 
of continuing in hot pursuit after enemy planes engaged in 
combat over Korea, and of bombinc; the supply bases v1hich 
gave the enemy privileged sanctuary. He also had asked that 
w:>e be mrtde of the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. 
In discussions with General Collins, MacArthur had pointed 
out tho need to lift the restrictions on air operations 
ar;ainst Chinese bases in Nanchuria and the use of Nationalist 
forces.4 
In his speech to Congress MacArthur said that the 
Joint Chiefs oi' Sta.ff had agreed \vi th him concerning his 
proposal to blockade China, to remove the restrictions on air 
reconnaissu.nce over Manchuria, and to mu.ke use or the 
Nationa1is t forces on :F'orrnosa against the Chinese Communists, 
He cited a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 
,-
January 12, 1951 to support his statement.' 
Senator Wiley asked MacArthur if he had ever ad-
vacated the invasion of the Chinese mainland by United States 
ground force::>. Tho General rwm·Jered: "Senator you know 
thot is ridiculous. No man in his proper senses would ad-
vocate throwing our troops in on the Chinese mainlunct." 6 
3 .I.£1.£., P• 12 .. 
5 J:.Qi£.' p. 13. 6 1.£1.9.. , P• 29. 
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Senator Wiley asked: you have indicated in your 
public addresses that there has been a failure to take 
certain needed political decisions in the Korean matter. 
Can you te71 us what • • • those decisions might well 
have been. 
The General answered as follows: I would have served 
--as soon as it became FiJ)parent that Hed China was throw-
ing the full might of its military force agr;dnst our 
troops in Korea, I would have served warning on her that 
if she did not within a reasonable time discuss a cease-
fire order, that the entire force of the United Nations 
would be utilized to bring to an end the predatory attack 
of her forces on ours. 
In other words, I would have supplied her with an 
ultimatum that she would either come and talk terms of 
cease fire within a reasonable period of time or her 
actions in Korea would be regarded as a declaration of 
war a.gainst the nations engaged there and that those 
nations would take such steps as8 they felt necessary to bring the thing to a conclusion. 
MacArthur believed that the way to bring the \1/ar to a 
conclusion without abject appeasement \vas only by the appli-
cation of superior force. He said that there were three 
choices of action: To pursue to victory; to surrender to the 
enemy; or, he said, "what I think is the worst ••• to go 
on indefinitely ••• in that stalemate; because what we 
are doing is sacrificing thousands of men while vJe are doing 
it •• • • 
When he was questioned regarding the conversations be-
t, ..,.een President Truman and himself at Wake Island, MacArthur 
declined to answer on the grounds th,:Jt they were of a con-
--~ Hearings, Part 1, p. 29. 8 lill•, P• 12. 
9 1.!21Q.., p. 67. 
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fidential nature. However, in his Memoirs President Truman 
said that MacArthur had told him that he thought there was 
very little chance the Chinese would come into the war. 10 
This point was confirmed by MacArthur's biographer, Frazier 
Hunt. 11 
The Administration's policy in Korea. MacArthur al-
leged, was n.o policy at all. "There is, n he said, "no pol-
icy--there is nothing, I tell you, no plan or anything." 12 
This did not go unchallenged by the Administration wit-
nesses, and will be taken up in the next chapter. Mac-
Arthur's attitude was an interesting and rather effective 
method of discrediting a viewpoint with which he disagreed. 
It should be said, however, that in this instance Mao-
Arthur's approach was positive, while the Administration's 
was negative. Probably the most important strategic con-
cept of the United Nations and of the Administration in 
Washington was to limit the conflict to Korea, and it was 
felt that MacArthur's strategy might broaden the area of 
warfare; that it could even result in World War III. 
On the subject of the Martin letter Senator Green 
asked if the two letters made public were the whole of the 
correspondence between them. MacArthur answered, rather 
10 Truman, .QJ2• cit., Vol. 2, p. 366. 
11 Hunt,~· cit., P• 475. 12 Hearings, p. 68. 
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vaguely, that he felt any member of Congress was entitled, 
within security provisions, to any information that he re-
quested . 13 
Senator Kefauver asked r1acArthur if he ha,d received 
information from the State Department , on the same day he 
wrote the letter to Congressman Martin , requiring further 
statements .bY him be coordinated in accordance with the 
directive of December 6, 1950 . The General said that he 
had not . 
N~xt Senator Kefauver asked: "But you did not feel 
that the letter to Congressman Martin would have required 
coordinating his letter as required by the order of 
March 20?" 14 
MacArthur ' s reply was: "Not in the slightest . " 15 
In the Martin letter t he G~neral had in effect taken 
his case to t he people by going to one of their elected 
r epresent at ives . The fact that he dealt directly with the 
President's political opposition was bound to arouse the 
wrath of the President even though the Congressman had ini-
tiated the correspondence . 
Everyone seemed to agree that a subordinate should 
make his views known to his superiors when he disagrees 
with them, but probably most people would hold that it 
13 I'bid ., P• 46. 14 Ibid., p. 113 
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should ~3t011 there, es~~~ccially in the armed forces. ;:)en-
ato!_' Kcf:-cnver asked th~" General if' he thow~·ht it proper for 
a bric;adier or ma,jor XE'neral under him to t~~d-.:e i:J::oue \vi th 
hj_r:; ge:norrtl concent EW UH~ theater conu;:tnnder by 1.1ri tin:; a 
letter to a member o:f Congre!:5B when he knew it would be used 
in the debate about the w~y his compnign was beins conaucted. 
MacArthur replied that he wouldn't have the sli~htest objec-
tion, just Go fl() c1id it in a courteous, polite way follow-
in(~; the normal code of n gentleman's conduct. 16 Under the 
circumst:mce:::-> :it vwuld havo been inconsistent for the Genera.l 
to sa:y anything else, but military officers cGrtn.inl;)' nrc 
discour:71god from tlv: une ol' J!Oli tical influence. 
He~;.'.lrding tbe circumstinwes surroundin~-; his dimnissal, 
l''lr~.cArthur testified that the first word he ha.d received was 
from his wife, who was ndvised by one of his airles who had 
heard it on a radio broadcast. The aide told Mrs. M~cArthur 
becnusG h·2 fe] t th, t ;;;he could h:,_ndlo the situation better 
th~n ~nyone else. About thirty minutes lRter the official 
connnu:ni CFtt1on h:1 d bce.n r.ecei ved. T'1e order relieved the 
Gener:::-1_1 of hi::; cmmnand. upon its receipt, replacin~"; him with 
General IU ('~C\•JF-W, v1ho VJ8.f::l 3~50 mih;s a\:a;r on the Kore::m front. 
Crdina.rily the relief of a comm;Jnd is dom' in fF1C1i a way that 
the new comma.nder \4ill be briefed on the current status of 
16 ~., p. 114. 
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the operations. MacArthur testified that unquestionably 
this summary method of turning over great responsibilities 
jeopardized the interests of the United States. 17 
Whether the relief of MacArthur upon receipt of or-
ders actually did jeopardize the interests of the United 
States is a matter of some speculation, but it certainly 
could have. If it did not it speaks well for the state of 
MacArthur's military organization. 
Senator KnowL:J..nd called the attention of the com-
mittee and General MacArthur to an editorial in the~ 
I.2.!:!f Times of Hay 5, 1951 which appe<.:tred under the heading• 
"The Basic Disagreement": 18 
General MacArthur advances the thesis that once war 
has broken out the balance of control must be put in 
the hands of the military; and that no political con-
siderations should handicap the latter in winning such 
a war; while the Administration holds that in peace or 
'1'1<3.r, the civil ~overnmen t remains supreme. 
This statement seemed to imply tlEl.t the Gener,:tl did 
not agree with the democratic principle of the civilian con-
trol of the military in war as well as in peace. MacArthur 
called ti1e interpretation of' the Times "completely slanted." 
"At no time," he said, "in our system of ,:;;;overnment is there 
<'-11Y question of the civil adrrlinistrd,tion being in complete 
contro1. 19 He said that what he meant to convey was that 
there should be no non-professional interference in the 
17 Ibid., p. 26. 18 lhiQ., Po 289. 19 l!.QQ. ill· 
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hFmdling of troops in a campaign. He also said that whoever 
wrote that article was completely biased or should have his 
head exc~ined. 20 
The tes~imony .Qf General Wedemeye_r. :Because of very 
exten~dve military experience in the Far J~ast, v!ed.emeyer's 
views were desired by the committee. He had relieved Gen-
eral "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell when that officer was unable to 
get a.long with Chiang Kai-shek. He vJas in China during the 
Marshall mission and saw the fall of the Nationalists to the 
Chinese Heds. According to Time magazine, he was a "classic 
speciman of what the Army calls a Brain, an officer Hho is 
on speaking terms with history, economics and geopolitics, 
as well as with smaller military subjects.n 21 During most 
of his career he had been a staff officer; eventually he be-
came one of the most important in the Army, Deputy Chief of 
~~taff in charge of planning, from October 1948 to August 
1949. Consequently he was unusually well informed on the 
many ra.mi:fications involved in the Korean situation. 
For several years the famous Wedemeyer Heport was 
classified top secret by the Defense Department, after the 
General refused to withdraw certain statements considered 
embarr;;~_ssing by ·the State Department. One of these i terns 
20 Hearings, Part 1, p. 289. 
21 ~' June 25, 1951, PP• 18-19. 
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recommended the establishment of a guardianship in Nan-
churia and a trusteeship in Korea. One of the objec-
tions concerned the establishment of a guardianship of five 
powers in Manchuria. This included the Soviet Union, but it 
was intended to keep Russia from taking over in that area. 
The trusteeship for Korea was to be under the United Nations. 
This was in 1947, at which time General Marshall was Sec-
retary of State. 22 
The testimony of Genere.l V/edemeyer brought out that 
he was opposed to the idea of trying to form a coalition 
government of the Communists and Nationalists in China, and 
that !1e had informed General Marshall of the difficulties 
involved in that plan \vhen f4arshall arrived on his China mis-
sion in 1945. Wedemeyer did not have tl:.te difficulties with 
Chiang Kai-shek that Stilwell had; he felt that Chiang was 
our one hope in China and that he should be supported. 
For a region that was not directly involved in the 
Korean fighting, Formosa had come in for a great deal of 
attention. Of course; both Korea and :Formosa were related 
to the China rroblem, and the committee wanted to know more 
about the strategic importance of each region to the United 
States. Concerning Jt'ormosa, \'iedemeyer said that vlhile it 
was not vi tal it was a rrwst important bastion against the 
22 Hearings, Part 3, pp. 2326-27. 
Albert c. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1958) pp. 463-79. 
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advance of Communism, and it enabled us more effectively to 
neutralize offensive action from bases on the mainland. If 
necessary, Wedemeyer favored putting our ground forces on 
Formosa to defend it. 23 
When the forces of North Korea had invaded South Ko-
rea and President Truman had ordered MacArthur to resist, 
MacArthur had advised that it would be necessary to make use 
of ground troops to repel the North Koreans. Aware that 
most military men agreed with MacArthur, Wedemeyer happened 
to think differently. With humility he said to the com-
mittee, 11 1 could be so wrong. 1124 This did not mean that he 
was opposed to the defense of South Korea, but that he would 
have used air and sea forces only against North Korea. Ob-
serving that there were many polV"der kegs around the periph-
ery of Soviet Russia he said, "We should not allow them to 
be fused at Russia's convenience and loss of manpower to 
their third team." 25 
On October 7, 1950, the General Assembly had adopted 
a resolution stating that the essential objective of the 
United Nations in Korea was the establishment of a unified 
and democratic government of Korea and recommended that all 
appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of stability 
23 Hearings, Part 3, p. 2318. 
25 l]1g., PP• 2307-08. 
24 !£!&., p. 2533. 
throuchout Korea. 26 This indicated that the Thirty-eighth 
Parallel was elimtne.ted as tlte boundary between North <:md 
South Korec.t. 27 
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General MacArthur had stated th;.\t he cUd not know what 
the policy was in Korea. He had further objected to the rc-
striations irnpoGed u.pon him in the United Hatiom:;' effort to 
limit the war to Korea. Wedemeyer agreed with MacArthur that 
no restrictions r.-1.t r• . .ll should be imposed on the the;::ttcr com-
mander once a mi[.;~:ion like this one hn.d betm declared. !uw 
restrictions, he felt, req_uired a chanee in the mic:nion. The 
result was that 1:!edemeyer believed thr.t r·1acArthur our;ht to 
h::1V0 been e>.uthorized to bomb enemy supply baser:; and lines of 
communications and to use whatever combat-ready Nationalist 
forcE's uere available on l'ormosa. General \·;ederneyer pointed 
out thr.t thec::~.ter com,r~c:mders do become involved in m~:tkinp; 
policy \'/hen no clear-cut. instructions rtre issued. He h:3 .. cl E'X-
actly that experience in China when he had found it necessary 
to order his forces to fire on Red Chinese who attacked 
.American troops. "A then.ter commo.nder," he said, "is com-
foreicn policy in the 
Lm1ever, it should be 
26 lli.S.· ' l.'art 
27 ill£.' r::-:rrt 
~)8 
..!.!1.£. ' Tart 
pointed. 
1 ' PP• 
3, PP• 
28 
of direction from home." 
out that the Corr·munists 111ere 
361-62. 
2550-51 .. 
3, P- 2347 • 
81 
not then the government of China, and that our forces were 
in China at the pleasure of the Nationalist government. 
Se:nn.tor Morse did not agree that !V1acArthur had not 
been informed concerning what the policy was; he said, 
"Speaking for myself, I would say ••• there is no evidence 
• • • that he was not fully advised at all times as to what 
20 the policy o:f the Government was." ':7 
General Wedemeyer replied that MacArthur had been 
criticized for moving across the Thirty-eighth Parallel and 
then against the Chinese forces, but that, "he had to do 
those things." 30 Wedemeyer also indicated that he personally 
doubted that there had been a clear-cut policy enunciated to 
l~acArthur. 
Senator Fulbright asked General \vedemeyer what he be-
lieved the policy in Korea should be. To answer this the 
General said that he would have to step out of the realm of 
an Army officer, because "what an Army officer needs is 
direction as to what you civilians want to accomplish. • • • 
If you tell me what you want to accomplish, I could help 
you determirw what th(:: military action should be •• • • 
His answer to the Senator's question was that: We should get 
the ground forces out of Kon'.la and use a.ir and naval units; 
29 Hearings, Part 3, p. 2347. 30 1&.2.. ill· 
31 Ibid., p. 2362. 
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th<:~t Formosa and not Korea was strategically important to us; 
we should break off relations with Soviet Russia, and take 
the strategic initic:ttivo rnnw from thcm.32 
This led to a discussion of a possible truce providing 
for a cease-fire at tt1e Thirty-eighth Parallel. Since we 
went in there in the first place to create a united, free 
Korea, Wedemeyer felt that such a truce would be a psycho-
logical defeat for us, but that it was better than caine on 
usinr:: up our mGnpO\\rer in a mili tr:try stalemrcte aga.1nst \vhat 
he CE:tlled thE: third team of the Soviet Union. 33 
One of the most controversial aspects of MacArthur's 
gnnC::ral attitude had bE~ en his recommendation that "vle p;o 
alone" in case our allies in the United Nations did not go 
<:Clang \Jt th us ree;arding such thin;.:~:> as the blockade of the 
Chimt const. vJhile General Wedemeyer stront_;ly favored a 
United Nations effort, he also felt that in case the other 
members of the United Nations would not support us we should 
r .. ':o ~~lorle'. 34 1! "· ~ '· t 1· • , t' t th l bl' f ·b · " ·" r e 01 c, no ·c · J.11nK m2. e )Om .ni; o nses 1n 
Ha.nchurir:. or the n:::wal block<~de of China was an e.ct of war, 
since th0 initial aegression had already occurred on th~ 
part of the Chinese Communists. 
One of the specific points where NacArthur was con-
32 Ibid., PP• 2362-63. 33 ill.£., pp. ?360-61. 
34 Ibid., P• 2')36. 
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sidered by the Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to h:.ve gotten out of line involved the Harch 20 meGsage of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he had been informed that 
the State Department was "planning a Presidential announce-
ment" concerning conditions of settlement in Korea. 1'he 
message indicated th<\t time would be required to determine 
diplomatic reactio:ns c1..nd permit nev.T negotiations thc:d might 
develop. 35 
Senator Cain pointed out that MacArthur was not told 
th<::t the President was going to take any action with respect 
to either a cease-fire or negotiations with foreign govern-
ments. Wedemeyer concurred in this and also with the point 
tho.t v1hile tviacArthur could not have known the nature of these 
negotiations, as Supreme Com:mander in the F'ar East he should 
have been advised that they had been undertaken.36 
The t'1artin letter was the climax of the MacArthur con-
troversy. Senator Bridges asked Wedemeyer if he would have 
answered such a letter from Congressman Martin. The answer 
was affirmative--but that he would h<we asked that the reply 
be kept confidential, and he would h:,we advised the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and recommended th<~.t they contact Congressman 
~1artin o.nd clarify the confused situation. 3'7 He said that 
35 lQi£., Part 3, p. 3541. 36 Ibid., Part 3, p. 2468. 
3 7 !J2i.sl.. , Part 3, p. 230'7. 
84 
hE would not object to an officer of his comma.nd writing 
frankly to any Senn~tor or Congrer;;sman and \vas confident tha.t 
it went on all the time.38 
The relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to field 
commanders was the object of some searchin£: qucst:toning by 
Senator Sp~rkman. He noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
serve as the top military advisers to the nation, and then 
asked, "In case of a dis.::tgreement between a field commander 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whom should we as members of 
Congress and to whom should the American people look for 
guidance? 11 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, without question, sir, 
Wedemeyer replied. They are your senior military ad-
visers, and I have explicit confidence in their in-
tegrity and in their loyalty •••• I do not always 
agree with their judgment as an individual but I ~Quld 
never question it if I were a member of Congress.J'j 
Regarding the appropriateness of the d.ismissal,Gen-
eral \>iedemeyer testified th;:1t when the President lOE5es con-
fidence in or feels that he has a commander in a remote 
area who i~3 not carryiw3 out his orders, it is incumbent 
upon him to relieve the commander. However, in this case 
the msnner in which it was done made most Americans un-
happy. In this case i3enator Norse agreed with General 
V!edemeyer. 40 
38 Ibid., J?art 3, p. 2510. 
40 Ihi£. , P• 2346. 
39 IQi£., p. 2476. 
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.!.!:!£ test.imony of former Secretary .£! Defense, Louis 
Johnson. Mr. Johnson said that he did not have any prepared 
statement for the committee, but that he would not violate 
the confidences of the rresident obtained while he vJas a mem-
ber of the cabinet. He also noted that he had not talked 
publicly or privately about his departure from the Defense 
Department, about the Defense Department, the removal of 
MacArthur, or any allied subject.41 
Senator Bridges asked the former Defense Secretary 
to explain what were the reasons for going into Korea, and 
what were the objectives--as determined by the conference 
that took place on June 24, 1950. 
Johnson's ex~olanation was a realistic D.:ppraisal of 
the official stand of the United States: 
The fairest statement I can make as to the general 
approach \vas that if you let this one happen, others 
\iOuld happen in more rapid order. • • • The impression 
wo::~ ~:tbroad • • • that we were not going to do anything 
about it.42 
Besides the fact thn,t the aggression of North Korea vlould 
damage American prestige, it \vas a clear violation of the 
United Nations Charter. 
Johnson said th.r;t t before the fighting began the State 
DepD.rtrnent had spoken for our government on Korea. The 
recommendation to defend South Korea came from the Secretary 
41 Ibid., Part 4, P• 2570. 42 I.h.Li, , P• 2585. 
of st·e,te, and it was concurred in by the Secretary of De-
fense. Johnson said that the possibility of Chinese or 
Russian intervention was considered a calculated risk. 43 
Senator Bridges wanted to know whether, at that 
time, 44 the objective was just to drive the Korean Com-
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munists back beyond the Thirty-eighth Parallel, or whether 
it was the United Nations objective stated later--a demo-
crntic free Korea, or if there were some other objective. 
Johnson said that no conclusion had been stated on any of 
these points, including whether we stopped at the Thirty-
eighth Parallel, the Yalu River, or any other 1ocation.45 
One of the chief points of interest turned on whether 
MacArthur had followed the instructions he received from 
Washington. Apparently the President did not think that he 
had. Sen:-ttor Wiley asked: 11 During the time you were Gee-
retary did MacArthur follow directives of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and Secretary of Defense implicitly and faithfully?" 
Mr. Johnson: "Yes sir."46 
Johnson went on to sa.y thc:t t he thought that MacArthur 
had done one of the outstanding jobs in Japan that was ever 
43 Ibid., Part 4, PP• 2584-85. 
44 June 26, 1950 conference of the President, Sec-
retaries of State and Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
45 Hearings, Part 4, pp. 2585-86. 
46 ..!_lli., P• ~?591. 
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done by any America.n anywhere, and that he was one of the 
greatest, if not the greatest, general of our generation. 
Hegarding MacArthur's recommendations concerning the 
steps to be taken in the Korean fighting, Johnson was in 
Etgreem1:mt with some, but not all of' them. He approved of 
the intensification of the economic blockade of China, and 
of the w;val blackade of China, but not of the Hussian con-
trolled ports. He would have followed the advice of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff on air reconnaissance over the coastal 
areas o:f Chine. and Ma.nchuria, and he would not have removed 
the restrictions on the Nationalist forces on }'ormosa. 47 
Johnson testified that the ever increasing burden of 
the cost of national defense had become a major issue for 
the Truman Administration. In 1949 the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff had asked for a thirty billion dollar budget. This 
amount was cut to about twenty-three billion dollars by 
Defense Secretary Forrestal.48 The 1950 budget called for 
still more reductions. Johnson said that he, the Defense 
Chiefs, and General Eisenhower were called to a budget meet-
ing and were advised that the President had approved a 
thirteen billion dollar defense budget. He said that it 
was the first time those present had ever heard of it, and 
47 Ibid., Part 4, PP• 2604-05. 
-
48 ~., p. 2597. 
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that he "was sick about it." 49 The figure had been worked 
out by the President's Economic Adviser, Edwin Nourse, and 
50 the Director of tf1e Bureau of the Budget, }"rank Pace. 
This amount was designed to get the fat out of the Defense 
establishment and trim it down to muscle. Regarding his 
ovm convictiom:; concernintJ thi:::; bud!:,~et, Johnson said, "If 
there \vas peace this was entirely too much; if there was 
w:ir it vJas entirely too little. n5 1 Senator Lone; noted that 
we \vere criticized for spendinf:: too much ri{)'lt up until the 
Korean War, and then we were criticized for not spending 
enough. 
Johnson agreed with MacArtlrur regard1ng the contri-
bution of our United Nations allies. "Despite my hope in 
and support of the United Nations," he said; "I am heart-
sick and remain indignant tlla.t f.>O many have done so li t'tle 
in sharing the sacrifices •••• "52 However, he did not 
propose • or St..l.{~ges t 'that we "go it aJ.orw." 
The hand lint; of MacArthur's dismissal ha.d distressed 
Joh.n~;on as it did almost everyone--probably includin{; the 
President;. He said th~:;. t he would tuve asked that it be 
hand. led in fwnw other way, like sendinp; Harriman or going 
himself, had he still been Secretary of Defense. The sub-
ject of dismissal had been brought up by the President 
49 Ibid., Part 4, P• 2598. 50 Loc. ctt. 
--
51 Ibid. , p. 2705. ~·2 r- · d ')712. ?- --lU:...:.•' p. <:. -· 
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wi:1un t1acc\rt.hur :-;en t hi::; mou;;:;age to the Vc torans of J:'oroign 
lie £nid tJ1,;.t ;since he diu not luve dll ti;e facts 
concerrdng t;w basis for t1w dismh~sal, hL3 personal opinion 
could only mudcty up the vJa tor, :~md ne declined to comrrten t on 
it. However, he did -z;.'J.y tnat if tho :President h'l.d lo;:o.t con-
fidence in MacArthur <~ cl1::w1L;e ""as in order. 54 
'l'he succc~3sfu1 L:..ndinc; :..tt I•Jcl;on took: pls.ce on :~~Jep-
tember 15, 1950. Just four d~ys l~ter Secretary of Defense 
timinJ; a resignution could not he tied to such a saccessful 
s t::u1c:as viere. TLu 3ecre Ltry sa.id th.J.t he had actually been 
forced to resiic,n. t•.vo <.L'<Yf> befor·<;; Inc'ton, but thJ,t bL" res-
igndtion was effective on tne nineteent;l. He went on to say 
that he did not know why he was ousted from tho Defense as-
tablishment, but tha.t it fntrt him. He felt thJ.t no and 
HacArtLur had ca,rried t'·1e burden of th<; responsibility for 
Incrwn' Vthile Gener ..il Collins hu \ gone to Kon~a to t nr to 
argue MacArthur out of it. 55 ~hatever the re~sons were, it 
soc~rr.ts to h :.ve been handled in,~p tly. Johnson waB su.cc:eeded 
by General George Marshall. V/ha t tri(3 Pro: ident • s rearc~on 
for tldi:, action \,Jere is not indicated in ti·t<3 Truman Hemoirs, 
53 Ibid., Part 4, pp. 2586-87. 
55 JJ::i£., PP• 2617-18. 
54 lQ!£., p. 2604. 
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but his well known admiration for Marshall may well have 
been tho explanation. 
An additional factor which possibly contributed to 
Johnson's requested resignation was his doubt about the 
~>tate Department attitude tm.vard Formosa and Chie,ng Kai-
shek. He said that our government "recognized" the Nation-
alist government, but did not "support" it. 56 The State 
Department motion to protect Formosa with the Seventh Fleet 
was a great surprise and relief to him. This feeling went 
back to December 1949, when the State Department opposed, on 
political grounds, sending a military mission to E'ormosa. 
The President, disregardin~;~ military considerations, sided 
with the State Department on political grounds. 57 It 
therefore seems probable that the President had at least 
two obvious reasons for replaci!l{s Johnson: the first was 
that he felt that General Marshall was better qualified for 
the cabinet post; and second, he could not have this type of 
fundamental disagreement in his cabinet. Neither could he 
afford to make his reasons public. 
~ testimony Qf Patrick Hurlex. One of a few people 
to know first hand why China had charl{)ed from friend to foe, 
Hurley was in a position to :furnish testimony that was in 
conflict with the Administration viewpoint. He told the 
56 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2596. 57 Ibid., P• 2578. 
-
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committee that m.ili td.r:y pLms bad to be kE3pt secret, but that 
the policies that cause tl1e commitment of a nc~.tion to war 
should not be kept from tho people affected by the commitment. 
He also felt trtiJ.t t 10 adn:'l.inistr:J.tion of our for,"Jign. policy 
v1as not in keeping wi til the policy announced to t'·\.G .L\.-rr1.erican 
people by tho Administration. 
Hurley said thu.t tho ch:.).nge in our foreign policy 
beg~n at Yalta in 1945. There we abandoned the principles 
of the Atlantic Charter for a policy based on concessions 
to communism antl imperialism, and on fear of Husr5i<:i rather 
than confidence in America. "Confidence in I\.me:r·:LGo., u he 
said, "is a better basi;;; for a foreign policy than fear of 
l)uc.· "l. a· "58 "\. }'::) '......- . 
As the American Ambassador to t~1e Republic of China 
from November 1944 to November 1945 Hurley had been under 
the wartime directive of President Roosevelt to work toward 
·tho unification of the forces of Nationalist and Communist 
China against Japan. However, he ha.d ordered the withhold-
ing of American lend-lea3e supplies from the communistl:.> 
unless and until they recognized tha sovereignty of and 
r·g 
placed themselves under t Le Ropublic of China.:> Thu. t rae-
ogni tion had not been fortncoming. r1eanwhile tho government 
of China was ·under attack from both within <l.nd vJ:Lthout. 
58 Ibid., Part 4-, P• 2F129. 59 Ibid., p. 2B99. 
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It '!/>l::O thi~3 situation in 1t1hich the United States l:L1d become 
increasin.c;ly involved becau:oe of thn l,tn,r rv';'l:lnst Japan. In 
1942 General Joseph Stilwell \vas chief of st'otff of th~c: ---
Allied armies in the China theater. Because a ereat deal 
of aid. ~tJas given to China,, the United Stet tee,; wanted ~wme 
voice in the planning of military operations in the China 
theater. HO\vever, a conflict of personalities made for an 
unworkable situation between Stilwell and Chianp; Kai-shek. 
In addition, the record of foreign domination in China was 
a source of ill-will and suspicion. Stilwell felt that 
Chiang had no intention of establishing a democratic regime 
and that he was milking the United States. 60 Relations be-
tween them became so strained that General Wedemeyer was 
sent to relieve Stilwell in October 1944. 
While he said th<.::tt he did not ::tgree with the ".Europe 
first" policy of World War II, it was the President's deci-
. d 1I 1 'I • t h. d . . 61 N' t•l 1 s1on, an .L ur ey mac~e 1 1s GClSlon. 1 ever .'le ess, 
Hurley believed th.:=t t we should not abandon Chhmg Kai-shek. 
He found him to be honest, an able and educated soldier, 
who vJas both a Chris ticm and an ti-Communi::.1 t. ~3<:ma tor Smith 
~van ted to know wlly, in viev1 of these favorable qualities, 
we had backed away from supporting him. Hurley blamed 
Sta,te Department personnel who were pro-Corrnnunir;t in their 
60 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2914. 61 IQiQ., p. 2925. 
th 62 sympa y. In contrast, Wedemeyer had felt that the real 
trouble lay in the conflict of ideologies, which could not 
be made to work together. Hurley said his job had been to 
bring the two Chinas together in a united effort against 
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Jap1:1.n, and he believed that it could have been done, but for 
disloyal elements in the State Department. Hurley believed 
that John I)atton Davies, Robert Service, and others in the 
State Department wanted the United States to go over to 
Communist Chim;.. Hurley vJanted the defense of China under 
the leadership of Chiane Kai-shek. \</edemeyer, on the other 
hEtnd, had felt that they would never get together, and that 
63 one or the other would have to control China. 
~ testimony of Vice Admiral Oscar :Badger. While 
he was generally friendly to the MacArthur viewpoint, 
Admiral Badger's testimony revealed some differences that 
were significant. He felt that our maJor strategic objec-
tive was to create conditions that would keep Russia from 
starting World War III. MacArthur undoubtedly agreed with 
this, but so did General Bradley. Their differences were 
in how to implement the grand strategy. 
In a speech to the National War College on March 14, 
1951 Admiral Badger said that we should initiate political, 
62 IQi£., Part 4, pp. 2912-21. 
63 Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Re£orts (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1958), p. 311. 
economic, humanitarian, and military objectives \vhich, in 
case of v1ar 1vi t11 Soviet Rur;sia, would permit us to be en-
gag(3d undor the most favorabh1 torms/ 4 
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On the use of Nationalist troops on Formosa he testi-
fied tllat hf~ las not familiar ·.vi trt their capability and th.:J.t 
their use--primarily for guerrilla fichting on the mainland 
of China--ought to be decided by the Joint Chiefs of 
65 Staff. ile ::>aid thu.t he u.nders toad Maci1.rthur' s recommen-
dation to be for ri:iids rather than a fulJ.-sc·clle invasion of 
China, but that these would he:J.ve to be very well pla.nned and 
. 66 tlmed. As to the uf;o of Formosa as a naval base 11e felt 
it was too small and its facilities were too restricted. 
However, he also f(-11 t ti:Lt t l''ormos<l was extremely important 
"' a,s a source of inflUence upon the thinking of ti1c: Chinese 
on the mainland. 
One of the things that MacArthur had resented the 
most was the sanctuary allowed the Chinese over the Korean 
border. To this point Admiral Badger testified that he was 
opposed to the recognition of Chinese sanctuary, but that 
his Ol)IJOsi tion applied to the Chinese vrho commit ted trw act, 
<::~.nd not the one v;ho was supporting it, Rus~1ia. Hot pursuit 
64 Hearings, Pil.rt 4, pp. 2728-29. Admiral Oscar 
Badger, speech to the National War College, March 14, 1951, 
"The Far ~astern World Strategy." 
65 Ibid., p. 2806. 66 I ' , 1. 07PO ...1?1J.... , p • ,_ 0 • 
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of enemy planes should be made until they are destroyed. He 
\·JOuld go along with the pro hi bi tion of bombing Manchurian 
bases, because we could to~in the war in Korea; hov.rever; a 
6'"{ plane attacking was another thing. 
Hot pursuit had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs 
and the State Department, but it had been rejected in the 
United Nations. 68 The Admiral declined to comment on the 
advisability of unilateral action on this subject on the 
grounds that he did not feel qualified to answer. On the 
other hand, he did say that even if we wanted to bomb 
Chinese ci ·ties and our allies disapproved he would not agree 
that we should go it alone. 69 
1.h..t testimonl of Ma,jor General Emmett 0 'Donnell, Jr., 
United States fu :Force. In his questioning of General 
O'Donnell, Senator Knowland listed the restrictions imposed 
upon the Air .Force. They are summarized as follows: 
Instructions to CINCJ:o'E [1::ommander in Chief J:'ar East] 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, 1g50 that pro-
vided for employment of United States naval ::m.d air 
forces against North Korea below the Thirty-eighth Paral-
lel only. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCYE on October 21, 
1950 that because of political implications, the State 
Department wanted a special report to the Security 
Council by CINCUNC [Commander in Chief United Nations 
Cornman~ to the effect that U.N. forces would not inter-
67 lhi£., Part 4, PP• 2798-2800. 
68 Ibid., PP• 2800-01. 69 Ibid., p. 2770. 
fere with the operations of the Suiho hydroelectric 
power plant near Sinuiju. 
November 6, 1950 Joint Chiefs of Staff directed 
CINCFE to postpone all bombing missions on targets 
,Ji thin five miles of the Manchurian border until fur-
ther orders. This order stopped a planned attack on 
the Yalu River bridge at Sinuiju, and the communica-
tion and supply centers there.70 
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MacArthur had protested the order to postpone the 
bombing missions in the Yalu River area, and requested that 
his protest be brought to the attention of the President. 
Owing to General O'Donnell's position and experience 
in Korea Senator Knowland wanted his views on the effects of 
these restrictions. The General testified that the United 
Nations decision to restrict us to the areas south of the 
Yalu put us under wraps and made us work against inordinate 
71 difficulties. 
·O'Donnell said that the Air Force was designed to 
do a devastating type of job, but that the tactical bomb-
ing missions it was doing was something else, and that it 
was not in keeping with the training and mission of the Air 
Force. 72 The sanctuary allowed the Red Chinese meant that 
their planes could attack our bombers on a hit and run basis 
from Manchuria. It also meant that as our planes approached 
the sanctuary they were subjected to anti-aircraft fire, but 
they could do nothing about it except try to evade the fire. 
70 IQig., Part 4, p. 3091. 
72 Loc. cit. 
--
71 1.2.£.. cit. 
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He further indicated thJ belief that tL.e Strd.tegic Air Com-
mand was not designed to fight a limited war. 
Tile comrni t tee questioned 0' Donnell on the vJisdom of 
bombing Mancriurbm bases. From a purely mili t;:Lry viewpoint 
he was probably better qualified to answer this than anyone 
who appeared before the committee. Prefacing his rema.rks 
with the observation that he spoke beyond his position as a 
bomber commander; he said that, in November, "he thought we 
ouglJt to punish thorJe people and let them know tb:tt they 
can't come in as an aggressor and get away witil it.n73 
O'Donnell's concern for wLat h.tppens as a result of tho ex-
ercise of military responsibility is an interesting contrast 
with the military men who become involved in political de-
cisions, and tho politicians who become involved in military 
decisions. 
He believed tn~t at a very small cost in casualties 
\ve could have hit them hard and perhaps evan stopped them in 
November 1950. At that time their antiaircraft fire was not 
good and they had very little e;ood fighter cover. Hov1ever, 
the situation soon cttc;~.nged to sucl1 an extent that the prob-
lam had to be reevaluated. This turned on whether we could 
bomb Manchuria and still retain 11 our Sunday punch for Rus~:lia 
in case they get out of bounds." 74 This evaluation and 
7 3 I b i d • , Par t 4 , p • 30 7 2 • 7 4 1 o c • o i t • 
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decision should be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A 
primary consideration, O'Donnell felt, was that the 
Str,ltegic Air Command functioned as a deterrent against 
Soviet Russia, and our offensive potential could be weak-
ened by a major Air Force involvement in China. 75 In short, 
we had lost the advantage we held when China first entered 
the Korean War, and we had made a military mistake in not 
using the advantage when v1e had it. 
Asked about Formosa as a base of operations he said 
that we could get alons without it, since we have bases at 
Guam a.nd Okinawa, but that he certainly would not like to 
see it in unfriendly hands.76 
Summary:. General MacArthur's testimony indicated 
that he believed that t11e Sovie·t strategy was made on a 
global basis rather than on the conditions prevailing in 
Korea. While he recommended the bombing of enemy supply 
bases in Nanchuria, the "hot pursu.it 11 of enemy planes, the 
use of Nationalist forces, and a blockade of the coast of 
China, he was strongly opposed to the landing of troops on 
the Chinese mainland. He felt the Administration in 'tlash-
ington lacked a policy or a plan for the prosecution of 
the war. 
Regarding the Martin letter General MacArthur testi-
75 1.21:.£!., Part 4·, pp. 3072-73. 76 Ibid., p. 3086. 
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fL~d t~1at he felt t!u.t u.ny mo.:nbr.:.;r of Congress was ent;i tlc::d, 
within security provisions, to ~ny ·inforrestion he requested. 
He told th(~ comnitte(~ th.Jt he ::t{r,read completely wit.~; tr;e 
constitutional principle of civilian su.prer:nacy of tfte armed 
forces, lm t th .1.t there should be no non-professional inter-
ference in t;·Je h:J.ndJ.ing of troops in ;a, campaign. 
OtLter MacArthur wi tnesse::; agreed wi t.h t),e Gener'll in 
varyin{:; dee;rees. General v/edemeycr would h:-:tve u:_;ed rJei3, onld 
air power only to defend South Korea. General O'Donnell 
testified tbJ.t in .November 1950 \ve could f'l;,ve stoprled tl;o 
Chinese if vm ha.d hit them h;::J.rd in Manc!mria, but t.ha t the 
advantage we held at th;t time was not maintained. Since 
the Str,:lt~:;gic Air Corm.:J.and functioned a.s a mn .. jor deterrent 
aga.inr;t :3oviet Hus:.1ia, O'Donnell felt that it nhould be up 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine whether a major 
Air Force involvement in China should be undertaken. General 
v/edcnmyor C:Lgreed vii th t1acArthur th~, t no restr:i.ctions shm..tld 
be impo::;ed on a t;1eator corrrmander once a mission had been 
i..!.rhlert;;};:en. lie concurred in the bombing of onomy supply 
b'U3es in Hanc!-;uria and tl1c u~;e of coraba t-ready Na tiona.lis t 
troops. :1e also ae;reed tf·ut we should "go it c1.lone" if 
th~t were necessary, but he preferred a United Nations' 
effort. Admiral Badcer, though he generally ~upported 
MacArthur's views, was oppoGed to any unilateral action on 
our part. He opposed the recognition of the Chinese mili-
tary sanctuary, but would not bomb Manchurian bases. He 
also favored hot pursuit of enemy planes until they were 
destroyed. 
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Former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testified 
that MacArthur had followed instructions implicitly and 
faithfully, but that if the President had lost confidence 
in him a change was in order. 
c:-IA.P'r.~:R VI 
The testimonv of SecretarY..·· of State Dean Acheson. As 
- "- - .,...,.,. ._ I -- - -- ._.,.,___ 
a witness Secretary Acheson was careful not to be clever; 
HL' testimony was logical and calm, but he could not match 
the drama of MacArthur, and he did not try. The fact is 
that because of this, the country seemed to care less about 
what he had to say. 1 
The questioning of t!1e 3ecretary covered a very wide 
range of subjects, many of 0hich had no direct bearing on 
the relief of MacArthur. In addition, there \vas much that 
was sirnply repetitious and, it would seem, unnecosi:'iary. It 
is possible that his examiners wanted to see if they could 
catch him in a contraJiction, but if so they were unsuc-
cessful. Send-tor Wiley was perhaps his illOst unfriendly ex-
aminer. It should be understood that leading questions are 
-
an acceptable form of examination before a Congressional 
commit tee. Acheson agreed wi tL ;::Jenator \'Iiley that MacArtl1ur 
had done~ a very fine job in Japan, and th;J,t our allies 
agreed with our policy. 2 
Certainly one of' tt1e weakest points for Ache~.:;on con-
1 U.S. ~ 2:, World Heport, June 15, 1951, p. 34. 
2 Hearin~s, Part 3, PP• 1980-81. 
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cerned his speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 
1950, in which he said, by implication, that Korea was out-
side the United States Pacific defense perimeter, It was 
felt that his speech opened the door to South Korea for in-
vasion by North Korea. Hi.'-5 explanation of this was that the 
United States had troops stationed at certain points which 
formed a defense perimeter, and that the other areas would 
first have to defend themselves, then the guarantees of the 
United Nations would take effect. Acheson testified that 
the United Nations had never proved a weak reed before, and 
that it \vouldn' t in the future. 3 It cannot be denied that 
some observers might indeed question this. 
MacArthur had claimed that he did not know what the 
policy was in Korea; that actually there was no policy. 
Senator Bridges referred to the President's statement of 
November 16, 1950, in which he said, "It is the policy of 
the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea 
inviolate an.d that a unified, independent democratic gov-
ernment be established throughout Korea. 114 
Acheson. In the period shortly after the Inchon 
ln.ndings until the intervention of the Chinese Com-
munists, it looked as though both of these objectives 
could be attained. That is, that as the forces of 
the North Koreans who had been attacking South Korea 
were rounded up, destroyed, or surrendered that then 
th<:~ country could be put together and • • • , both 
3 Ibid., Part 3, P• 1741. 4 Ibid., P• 1735. 
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objectives vJould have beon re;.tlized •••• 5 
There was a distinction made by the Secretary of 
State regarding the method to be used for tbe unification of 
Korea. He testified that since 1947 the United Nations, and 
since 194 3 or 1944· the United States, had stood for a uni-
fied and democratic Korea; that was still our purpose and 
the purpose of the United Nations. However, he did not un-
derstand this to be a war aim. The military objective was 
to stop the attack on South Korea, restore peace, and provide 
measures to prevent renevml of aggression. Thus the Sec-
retary of State was sayinG that the military objective was 
to restore South Korea to the boundaries and conditions that 
existed before the invasion of North Korea. If so, what 
then were MacArthur•s troops doing up near the Yalu River 
v1Lon Communist China intervened? 'J?o ~3enator Cain tbiu looked 
like ,em attempt to unify- Korea by force. To MacArthur, cross-
ing tho Tl1irty-oighth Parallel was a tactical necessity eom-
pelled by the Inchon developments. A h'1lt HoulJ have sur-
rendered tho military advtmtage to tlw Communists and left 
the United Nations' forces exposed to a counterattack at the 
enemy's convenience. Acheson's explanation was, "You ha.ve 
not restored peace and security if tMere are people on tho 
other side coming over stnd fighting ;you. You ho .. ve to try D .. nd 
5 tlearings, Part 3, p. 1735. 
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stop tl:t:J,t condition of fit:Jltinc; .J.nd v.f.::,r that i::; going on. n 6 
The peculiar thing is that ~cheson's ju3tification of cross-
inc the Thirty-eighth Parallel would seem to justify Mac-
Arthur';::; de .. nand to carry the war to China b;y bombing and 
blocka.de. 
bring to bear for bombing the Manchurian bases of Red China, 
the fundamental point vras that the Admini f .. , tra tion vn:mtod to 
linli t the 1r1ar to Korea. Acl:.teson pointed out th;Jt no one 
could accurately forecast cloviet reactions, but that some 
known factors had a bearing on t~e question and should be 
taken into account. First was the known Soviet assistance to 
North Korea and Cormnunist Cb.ina. nv/e lrno\v," s::dd Ac!>eson, 
"unden.> t .. t:;td.in:;s must have accomlianied this aid. 117 
Second was the fact that a treaty existed between the 
Soviets and Communist China. f~von if a treat;v did not exh.;t, 
Chin<;;, was the most importa.nt ~3<'itolli t.e of t1lc..: Soviet Union, 
and her self-interest and prestige in the Fdr ~ast m~de it 
difficult to see how Ruosia could i~nore a direct attack on 
~· . . t .Lf 8 (.;tuna 1 se ..• 
Third, v;e could not expect our collec ti ve-securi ty 
syst(-.rm to survive if we took action that other members of the 
6 Ibid., Part 3, p. 1782 7 Ibid., p. 1719. 
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system disapproved. 
The Joint Chic if:;. of ;; t;~ff [1;:-;.d recommended trw rLpiJli-
cution of tho doctrine of "hot pursuit" of enemy pLmes over 
the Yalu Hi ver. It VJFtS turned down as a rer:ml t of checking 
with our allies through their embasoies instead of t,oddng it 
up in Uw ::iecud. t;y Council becaus13 of tho pros<:,nce of Soviet 
Thi13 subject h.:::td ,\lic:;hly Gecre t c.L1ssi fica tion at the 
time. Here the diploma. tic ccn:sidera tio:nr; ou hrcighed t!w rnili-
tary tactics. 
Creneral Hd.cArtr·ur had been ver;y cri tic;:d. of ti'c; trade 
that was c~rried on between some of our alliee and China, 
eE;p~H.::iu.lly by GreD.t Britain. He ha.d propo -ed a naval block-
-
ade to brin6 this trade to a halt. ~uestioned about our 
trz.tde '-'d. tn China, Acl1e~;on stated th:·d, in ,June 1950 v1e had 
pL:wed an embargo on strategic materials, and held obtained 
the coopara tion of ti •e mu.jor oil companior:; on lfli tliholding 
::.;.i'Jip:ment:::; of oil from tLe I-Udcile i·;ast and JJ<:ttin America. In 
December 19 50' we pLlced a couple te Ulfllktrgo on cJll shirHnonts 
from. t: .. e Uni teci ~j tate::; and froze all Cormnunig t C!dnese funds 
(l 
' t' u 'L ;f , .. , t t ./ 1n 1W n1 t.G(t o a os. The ~..lecretary of ;:aate felt tru.t an 
economic blockade was to be preferred to a naval blockade. 10 
In addition to the fact th~t this involved military action 
directed against the mainland of China, it was also compli-
9 Ibid •• Part 3, p. 1725. 10 1.!2.i9.·, pp. 1830-31. 
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cated by the ports of Hong Kong and Dairen. 
Senator Saltonstall asked Acheson if the State Depart-
men t had any part in making the decision that Chinese tJa tion-
alist troops should not be used in Korea. 
Acheson. "Yes sir, vie recommended aga:Lnst it." 11 'l'he 
reasons given were, first, that it would weaken the defense 
of Formosa, and second, th:J. t it was complicated by tho other 
nations fighting in Korea who did not recognize the Nation-
alist Government. 
President Truman's explanation of MacArthur's dis-
m1ssal had been that he could not give whole hearted support 
of United States and United Nations policies. Senator Wiley 
wanted to know about this failure to carry out any policies. 
Secretdry Acheson said that these policies had to do with 
limiting the hostilities to Korea and not taking steps which 
might extend them into Manchuria or China, or possibly beyond 
that. 12 
Senator Wiley also called attention to a press confer-
once in \vhich the .President denied tfH:tt ti;ere was any curb on 
MacArthur's authority "to speak freely on the Korean ~ar." 
Acheson said tlktt this was not an accurate statement 
of what had happened at tho press conference. The subject 
had been whether or not authority }lad been ktl-cen away from 
11 Hearings, Part 3, p. 1763. 12 Ibid., p. 1d62. 
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MacArthur, by the December 6 directive, to issue communiques 
on the real military situation in Korea. 13 
However, no such curb on MacArthur was intended. 
Acheson disagreed with General \.!/hi tney' s interpretation of 
the December 6 order that held it as applying solely to for-
mal public statements, and not to communiques, correspond-
ence, or personal conversations with others. Neither did he 
~;ree with MacArthur that the March 24 ultimatum or the 
Martin letter dealt with the military situation and was 
within his uncontested authority to speak. 14 The tvlarch 24 
statement contained an implied threat; at the srune time the 
Secretary of State had been directed by the President to 
carry on conversations with our allies concerning their 
views as to possible terms of an armistice or a settlement 
of the Korean War. Acheson testified that MacArthur was no-
tified of these negotiations on March 20. He said that Mac-
Arthur's ultimatwn greatly embarrassed the President and 
created the impression that the United States was speaking 
with two voices, one the President and the other General 
1 r:· MacArthur. :? 
It may be argued that writing to a Congressman was 
not any different than appearing before a Congressional 
13 Ibid., pp. 1863-64. 
15 IQ!g.? pp. 1790-92. 
14 !h!£., pp. 1830-31. 
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committee conducting hearings. However, where the contact 
with the Conc~ressman showed the agent of' our policy in Korea 
to be out of sympathy with that policy such an argument was 
unsr:1.tisfactory. 16 The Martin letter v.Jas, according to the 
Secretary, not in keeping with the December 6 directive of 
the President, but while it justified his dismissal, Acheson 
did not agree that for a man of fvlacArthur's stature it should 
be put on the basis of disciplinary action. It was a matter 
of having 1)olicy agreement between Washin~;ton and the Korean 
commander • 
.!h.£ testimony .Q1 Secretary Qf Defense Georr:;e Harshall. 
VJh~1tever their personal differences may h1.:tve been, General 
Narshall found it very distressinr,,?; to appear before the com-
mi ttee in a1Ino~1t direct opposition to a great many of' the 
views and actions of General MacArthur. He said that he had 
trei,ie:ndous respect for NacArthur• s military capabilities and 
military performances, as well as his administration of 
Japan. 17 
I1arsha.ll sav1 Korea as another phase in the long, slow 
struggle against Communism. Citing the struggle in Greece 
H3 
and the Berlin blockade, he said, 11 1J/e can win again .. " 
As to the American advance beyond the Thirty-eighth Paral-
16 I'bid., pp. 1792-93. 17 1!2if!.·, l)art 1, p. 322. 
18 ~· ~! v!orld Renortt Nay 18, 1959, P• 19. 
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lel, he said that the United Nations' authority for this \vas 
permis::;i ve rather than mandatory. The United Nations forces 
were never given the task of unify in['; all of Korea by m.ili-
tary action. The unification of Korea was a political, 
ratf1er 10 than a military objective. J 
Obviously Marshall's thinking was global in its scope, 
anc1 it centered around the containment of communism. He 
said thitt there was no quick anJ decisive solution to the 
struggle, other than re;;orting to another world war. Ad-
mittedly this policy was costly, but it was not comparable 
to an atomic war. "We have," he said, "spurned appease-
ment. We have brou~ht to bear whatever has been necessary, 
in moneJ' and manpoVier, to curb the Ei,ggressor. • • • 
Korea was the latest challenge in this world-\vide ntruggle. 
The way to win in Korea was to keep destroying the 
Chinese armies there. Alreri~,dy four of their army groups had 
been destroyed, some thirty-four divisions. It was impor-
t::::nt because this was China • s trained manpower. 
The much debated point made by f··JacArthur tha.t the 
Joint Chiefs agreed with his phm for an economic boycott 
of China, bombinc bases in N:::l.nchuria, apply·i~s; a, mwal block-
a.de to the China coast, <1nd the use of the Nationalist 
troops was denied by Marshall. He said that these were 
19 Hearings, Part 1, p. 362. 20 I£1£., P• 366. 
~-11 ~ 
-I 
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tentative objectives which were dependent upon conditions in 
Korea for implementation~ If it became necess:.:ry to evacu-
ate Korea altogether, they were possible courses of action. 
Since that was unnecessary, both the Joint Chiefs and the 
National Security Council felt that it was inadvisable to 
t tJ~l·em · + f,f. t 21 pu lnvo e ec • 
Ordinarily a field comm~,_nder is free to try to arrange 
armistice terms with e.r1 enemy commrmder.. In this case, how-
ever, MacArthur had been notified that the President was at 
work in this area.. The General's ultimatum to the Chinese 
Commander, Marshall testified, "made it necessary for the 
President to abandon the effort, thus losing whatever ch:::mce 
there may ha.ve been at that time to negotiate a settlement 
22 
of the Korean conflict." The President then directed the 
Secretary of Defense to call General MacArthur's attention 
23 to the Presidential order of December 6. 
Bot.h Senator Taft and ~3enator Kno\vland strongly ur{:~ed 
th€~ use of the forces offered by Chiang Kai-shek in Korea. 
'l'es timon,y of both NacArthur and Marshall brout_;h t out the 
fD.ct that originally MacArthur recommended t!.gainst the ac-
ceptance oi' this offer because of their ineffectiveness and 
lack of logistic support. However, as our position worsened, 
21 Ibid., pp. 329-337. 22 Ibid., PP• 333-334. 
23 !QiQ., p. 344. 
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~acArttrur stroncly advised the use of the Chinese ~ationalist 
troops. 24 
General lYJarsh:.:\11 r:laid th~:.t the Joint ChiGfs were con-
vinced that these forces would not be effective in Korea. 
Furthermore, their departure from J<'ormo;;3a. would le::we that 
island exposed to Communist attack. 25 
As vlith the teBtimony of the Secretary of State, 
had to do with tbe extension of the conflict beyond Korea. 
General MacArthur ••• would have us, on our own 
initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea. against the 
mainland of Communist China, both from the sea a.nd from 
the air. He would have us accept the risk of involve-
ment not only in an extension of the war with Red China, 
but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would 
have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies 
and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout 
the \vorld. He \·!Ould havE~ us do this even though the 
effect of such action might expose Western Europe to 
attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle 
and Eastern Europe.2b 
Of course, it i~.o not in thE' nature of things for a 
mi1i tary comma.nder to agree with all of th.e orders he re-
ceives throughout his career. Marshall pointed out that 
Eisenhower did not h;:we things all his way in the European 
theater during World War II, and thRt he sometimes had dis-
agreed with President Hoosevelt. "It is," he said, "at times 
commendable tha.t a theater commander should become so wrapped 
24 Hearings, Part 1, P• 337. 
26 ~., P• 325. 
2., L •t 
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up in his own aims • • • that some of the directives 
are not tho::.;e he would have written for himself. n 27 
• • • 
What brought about the necessity for MacArthur's re-
moval was his public disagreement with both the foreign and 
military policies of the United States. It should be made 
clear that MacArthur did not violate any military policy. 
His suggestions for the bombing of Hashin and the utilizing 
of Chinese Nationalist forces were turned down and he did 
not act contrary to the orders. Thus it was possible for 
MacArthur to say that he had always carried out his orders. 
This was no doubt true insofar as it concerned military op-
erations. However, in the area of his public statements, 
MacArthur did a rema.rkable job of cloaking them with his 
"uncontested authority to speak." Secreta.ry Narshall said, 
"he took issue with the policy before the world. 1128 
Following the Chinese intervention, NacArthur had 
made several :public statements and press releases. On De·~· 
cember 1, he had advised Arthur Krock of the New 1.2.r1f Times 
that he had received no suggestions from any a.uthori ta.ti ve 
source that he should stop short of the Thirty-eighth 
Parallel, or a line short of the international boundary, 
and that the strategic course of the c~~aign was not re-
sponsible for the attack of the Chinese Communists. 
27 Hearings, Part 1, p. 325. 28 Ibid., p. 416. 
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Also on December 1 MacArthur had informed the Q.S. 
~ &: \vorld Report that the lirrd ts impo::>ed on his Command 
constituted an enormous handicap without precedent in mili-
ta.ry history. 
On the sa,me day, December 1, he had sent a message to 
the president of the United Press in which he statE'Jd his com-
mand was faced with an entirely new war. Finally he had 
criticized the limitations imposed upon retaliation against 
the Chinese Communists. 29 
The directive of December 6 had grown out of these 
statements, but j_ t was put in general terms in order to avoid 
m,!3king it specifically personal to t1acArthur. 30 This was the 
first specific directive he was given on public statements, 
and it simply required clearance on all statements concern-
ing defense and foreign policy. 
The Martin letter, like the March 24 release, should 
have been cleared in accordance with this order, but of 
course it would not have been released. The letter v1as 
brought to the attention of the President on April 5. A 
meeting \<Jas called, attended by the President' r; special as-
sistant, Averell Harriman, the Secretary of State, the Sec-
retary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of 
Staff. The following day the 1~resident requested Narshall 
29 Ibid., Part 1, p. 416. 30 !hi£., 9· 342. 
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to obtain the views of the Joint Chiefs. General Bradley 
gave tho;:,e vie~;;~3 tc the Pre;:.:;ident. Gen.er;;_l i'':arsha.ll testi-
fied that all of the Joint Chiefs and all of the people who 
met with the President to consider the situation aoncurred 
in the relief of MacArthur.31 
The handling of the dLmliss.•J.J wars one of the thin:;s 
th:3 t rankled the Gonc;ress mo,3 t. 'fha t the i3uprene Comrn;;,nder 
should hear about his relief on a news broadcast v1as inex-
cusablfl, and the Defense Department would have to answer f'or 
it. Marshall's explanation was t.hut Secretary of the Army 
.Frank Pace, then in Korea, was to deliver the mess:t.;~~e to Gen-
end. l11acArthur at his residence, the Embns;3y. Hovrever, the 
day before 1'1acArtl1ur's dismissal Ha.s to t2:.,.ke place there vwre 
indications that the action had become known publicly. The 
:!?resident then decided to speed up the transmission of the 
official notification to MacArthur by approximately twenty 
hours. The public release was planned to coincide with the 
arri VH.1 of U1t:' message in 1'okyo in midafternoon. However, 
Secretary Pace did not receive his instructions due to a 
breakdO\vn in a power unit in Pusan. 32 
Concerni.ng the news leak 3enator Hussell comm':nted, 
I think thnt it h1 one of the most sta.rtlill{~ instances 
I have ever heard of, that a matter of this tremendous 
impor~a~ce s~wuld :~:::.:.ve 3~ecome public before it \-Jas in-tendea that 1t sho~ld. 
31 1..!21.Q.; p. 345. 33 Ibid., p. 346. 
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1:.!:12, testimogx .Q! ~ Joint Chiefs .2..£ Staf'{. Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of i3taff, General Omar Bradley, was 
in a better position than e.nyone in the nation to know 
whether tha..t group agreed with NacArthur. Bradley pointed 
out that the message of January 12, upon vlhich MacArthur 
based his argument, was a result of the condition in Korea. 
On January 10, 1950, MacArthur indicated doubt about our 
ability to stay in Korea, Bradley testified that themes-
sage of the 12th was a study of what to do in case it were 
necessary to evacuate Korea. "To us it was clear that it 
was a study. Maybe it wasn 1 t • • • to General MacArthur; 
but ••• it was a study and never handled as a proposed 
directive." 34 
1'he foregoing testimony suggests that the Joint 
Chiefs were thinking along the same lines as I•lacArthur, 
but that MacArthur wanted these m.easures against China in-
voked immediately, while the Joint Chiefs were thinking in 
terms of a worsening military situation only. 
General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs were concerned 
with the military reasons for NacArthur's relief, and the 
committee concentrated on this area. Bradley testified 
that in his public statements MacArthur had indicated he was 
not in agreement with the decision to try to limit the con-
34 Hearings, Part 2, pp. 738, 1120. 
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flict to Korea. It follov1ed that this would make it dif-
~ 
M ficult for MacArthur to carry out the Joint Chiefs' direc-
f; 
tives. In other words, they needed a commander more respon-
sive to control from Washir~~ton. 
The Presidential directive of December 6 had re-
quired NacArthur to clear policy statements before making 
tt1em. However, he had taken independent action when he pro-
:posed to negotiate directly with ttH~ enemy field commander, 
and when he had made that statement public despite the fact 
that he knew the President was considering negotiations along 
that line. This action by General MacArthur, Bradley testi-
fied, jeopardized civilian control over military authori-
'7.5 ties.::; 
The committee wanted the Joint Chiefs to explain their 
differences vii th IvlacArt bur concerning how to v>lin the war in 
Korea. The course of action described as a "limited war" 
w::;1,s explained by .Bradley as an effort to avoid engagir1g too 
much of our po1,ver in an area that was not the critical stra-
tegic prize. 
Hed China is not the povJerful nation seeking to dom-
inate the world • • • this strategy would involve us in 
the wrong wr:tr, at the wron~ plcwe, at the wrong time, 
and with the wrow; enemy.' 
To support this charge Bradley said that he doubted 
35 l£is!., Part 2, PP• 878-79. 36 Ibid. P• 732. 
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tl1o efftcacy of l.tlinning the KoreD.n War through application 
of air po1r:er t:md blockade. \<far against Chinn, he thour;ht, 
would require sending ground troops to the Chinese main-
lanct.37 
.Scms"tor Bridges asl{ed, 11 Do you think it is fair to 
R.sk American troop~> to go into brd; tle V.Jhen the enemy has a 
complete sanctuary across the river?" 
General Bradley. "I don't admit. the.v have a sanctuary 
actually. • • • They are not bombing our ports and supply 
insta.llntions, • . • so that in a way, we have a sanctuary, 
too." 38 
The policy of a limited war had led some critics to 
charge W3 with appeasement. Bradley pointed out that a 
blockade of China, to be successful, would have to include 
the British port of Hong Kong and the Russian port of Dairen. 
J''orsaking Korea to aggression \V'OUlcl have been appeaGemcnt, 
but refusing to enlarge the conflict to the point \~here our 
global capabilities are diminished, is not appeasement but a 
militarily sound course of action in the circumstances. 39 
1'he increasinG influence of the mili tnry on tho nation 
in the twentieth century was examined b,v tho committee. \'Jere 
the nation's military leaders to be taken into the councils 
37 Hearings, Part 2, p. 745. 38 !Qi£., P• 751. 
39 Ibid., p. 733. 
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of the nation, or muzzled by the cloak of civilian control o:f 
the military? The following exchn.nge on this subject took 
place bet\¥eEH1 Senator Bridges and General Bradleye 
Senator Bridges. If it reaches the time in this 
country where you think the political decision is af-
fecting what you believe to be basically right mili-
tarily, what would you do? 
General Bradley~ Well, if after several instances in 
which the best military advice we could give was turned 
down for other reasons, I would decide 'that my advice waB 
no longer of a.ny help, why I would quit~ • • • Let them 
get some ot.her military a.dviser whosE~ advice apparently 
would be better or at least more acceptable. 
Sene •. tor Bridges. Would you H:peak out, tel1 the Amer-
ican public? 
General Bradley. No sir. • • • 
Senator Bridges~ Where does the loyalty to your 
country come in? 
General Bradley. I a.m loyaJ. to my country, but I am 
glso loyal to the Constitution, and you have certe.dn 
elected officials under the Constitution, and I wouldn 1 t 
pro:f'e~'s that my judgment wa.s better than tho President 
of the United States or the administration~ 
i'3enrttor Hridgf:::s. \1/ould it not be on a military sub-
ject? 
General Bradley. Yes • 
. 3enn.tor Bridges. i3hould you not ~c;peak out? 
General Bradleyo I would; yes, to the constituted 
authorities; yes. 
Senator Bridges., :Gut you vJould stop there? 
General Bradley. fes.40 
40 Hearings, Part 2, pp., 752-53. 
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Concerning the h<wdling of the dismissal, Bradley 
testified that he was not sure that the much discussed news 
lec.1.k really existed. There h::,,d been a great dec:;.l of specu-
lo,tion in the newspapers about it. The fact that "certain 
people" had made frequent trips to the White House gave sub-
stance to this speculation. Consequently, Bradley thought, 
it might be thr;.t people were jumping to conclusions as to 
what might happen.41 
The Joint Chiefs did not request the removal of Mac-
Arthur, but they were requested to give their opinions on re-
rnoVEll, from a military point of view. They unanimously 
agreed that from a purely military point of view he should 
42 be relieved. The handli11!s of the dismissal and the timing 
of the releese were directed by the President. The method of 
relief was not included in the views of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 
Quite aside from the Hearings themselves, but an out-
growth of them, General .Bradley became involved in an inter-
esting constitutional problem during his testimony. He was 
questioned about the conference of April 6, 1951, between 
President Truman, Generals fvlarshall and Bradley, Secretary 
Acheson, and Presidential Adviser Harriman, regarding the 
dismissal of MacArthur. Bradley refused to divulge the 
41 Hearings, Part 3, p. 1725. 42 1££. cit. 
120 
nature of the conference on the ground that he was in the 
position of a confidential adviser to the President. General 
MacArthur had done the same thing concerning the \'lake Island 
conference; Marshall declined to answer questions for the 
s<:tme reason and was not challenged. Chairman Russell ruled 
that Bradley was not required to testify to the quef:>tion. 
:3enator Wiley appealed the ruling to a vote of the committee. 
The ruling of the chairwan was sustained, by a vote of eight-
een to eight. 43 
The principal arguments for Bradley's position were 
the separation of' powers and the confidential relationship 
similar to that of a lawyer-client, or doctor-patient. The 
chief argument against this position was that it wc:ts public 
bm:;inest':i. Senator \Vi ley's reaction 1t1as th~1t the Hearings 
were "not only a whitewash but a washout.n44 
Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, fol-
lowed General Bradley as a witness. He was asked early in 
the~ questioning what he would do in case there were a con-
flict between duty and what he believed to be in the best 
interest of the country. He replied that he would feel com-
pelled to resign and speak out. 45 
The differences between MacArthur and Collins on strat-
43 Ibid., Part 1, PP• 870-72. 
45 lhi£., Part 2, p. 1194. 
44 !hi£., p. 912. 
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cgy \-.ICre intcrestlnc;. It ap:!e<:lrs t1ut Mrw1\rthur'n strategy 
prevailed in Korea itself, but not without some miscivings on 
tilJ0 llnrt of Collins. H<c: reftl:"":ied to c:r.i ticize thr,: troop de-
ployment in Korea, but. he dic1 not r:tpprove the ;3ending of Amer-
icEm troo:p:~; all the wny to the Yalu E'iver. He so.id th<;..t 
only Korean troopr:> should have been sent into this are£i. in 
order to prevent China from s.:wtng that they \.>Jere thres .. t-
ened by the presence of American troops on the Manchurian 
border. MacArthur said that it was a matter of military 
nece::mi t_y· anc~ tfu:;,t he could uo t stop short of the Yalu. 
Collins testified that MacArthur could have stopped on the 
high ground short of the Yalu, but that in fairness to Mac-
Arthur it should be noted that Red China inv2ded Korea before 
l/!acArthur' s forces reached the hich ground. The point is that 
MacArthur took exception to this suggestion of the Joint 
Chief:::~ which, Collins c1d<'led, was not e.n order. It was not 
feasible to order troop deployment from 7,000 miles avmy, 
but it was a.ppropriate to state tho policy within which to 
operB.te. The military necessity to vthich fvJacArthur re:fe:rred 
had reference to weaknesses of the South Korean troops. 
This eutimrte proved to be correct in the fighting against 
C . i C·l . 46 omiJ:LUnl ;:; ~ una. 
In general, ColJ.im> held about the Sf:Jllle views as 
P t 2 . 1''~~- 1 ... ar · , PP• ._It>- , • 
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Bradley with respect to limiting the war to Korea. A naval 
blockade would hrwe to include the port of Dairen and pos-
sibly even Vladivostok. He said that he had been in Dairen 
and that it is wholly modern and efficient as a port. To 
make such a blockade effective would be one of tho:3e border-
line things that might result in large-scale WEJ.r. 47 Purther-
more, if we got into a large-scale war we would need allies, 
and any unilatera.l action would preclude just that. 
The Joint Chiefs' study of Ja.nuary 12 that had caused 
so much controversy was made a point of questloning by Sen-
ator Russell, who wanted to know if General Collins had dis-
cussed it v1i th General MacArthur on hi~; January 1951 trip to 
Japan. Collins replied tha.t he had told General ~1acArthur 
that the items listed in that communication were represen-
tative of the views of the Joint Chiefs of various courses 
of action that might be taken if it were imperative to take 
48 them. Thif.l trip, and the study of January 12, were the re-
sult of the desperate situation in Korea. MacArthur had in-
dicated that we might be forced out of Korea, but since this 
did not happen, the measures posed in the study were not in 
order. 
It had been charged that the surrender ultimatum of 
47 IQi£., Part 2, p. 1189. 
48 Ibid., pp. 1189, 1210-11. 
MacArthur to thf; Chinese commD.nder, backed by threats of 
1 ') '7 '-·:.; 
carrying the war to the China mainland, embarrassed the Pres-
ident in his effort to negotiate a settlement. Senator 
Wiley asked if such a demand were unusual for a commander in 
the field. General Collins stated that it was not, and that 
twice before HD.cArthur had made such demands on the enemy, 
but in each case vd th the knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of 
('t f'f 49 ,, a • 
Recarding the handling of the dismissal, Senator 
Smith criticized the sending of the message which ordered 
MacArthur's relief, and held that one of the Joint Chiefs 
should have gone to Japan to advise him of' their thinking. 
Smith felt that MacArthur should have had the opportunity 
to see his troops, and that if the friction had been explored 
and could not be resolved, MacArthur should have been given a 
chance to withdraw. 50 General Collins regretted that the 
d1sm1st:;al was not handled in the way that it was planned, 
that is, without any breakdown or news leaks. He did not be-
lieve it had any adverse effects on the Army in Korea, be-
cause General RidgHay vms immediately available. "However 
it was done • • • , " Collins said, 11 it v1ould have been a 
shock to General MacArthur."51 
49 Hearings, Part 2, P• 1196. 
50 IQi£., pp. 1272, 1319. 51 lBi£., p. 1220. 
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GenGrc.l Hoyt ~>. Vandenberg, Air }'orce Chief of .Staff, 
vas tho next witness before the committee. He believed that 
nt3 sea power dornina.ted the world before the t\>Jentieth cen-
tury, it would now be dominated by the nation that controlled 
t} . 52 1e a1r space. 
By this time the questions of the committee seemed, 
gener::llly, to run along two lines. 1'he first concerned 
whether all of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff con-
sidered MacArthur to be wrone in speaking his mind on Korea, 
and the other concerned the strategic concepts in each of 
their respective areas. 
General Vandenberg a...:q;reed with Senator Norse that if 
a military leader disagrees with the Commander in Chief, he 
has an undoubted ri~:-~ht to carry the case to the American 
people, as a citizen, but 11e should resign before he speaks 
out contrary to national policy. 53 However, the Air Force 
Chief himself had publicly disagreed with Air .'F'orce budget 
cuts on two different occasions. 54 
The appa.rent ~:tgreement among the Joint Chiefs on 
MacArthur and on the Korean strategy seemed open to ques-
tion. Senator Bridges asked Vendenberg if he had ever dis-
agreed with other members of the Joint Chiefs on questions of 
52 .!.2.!.£!., Part 2, p. 1382. 
54 IQiQ., P• 1385. 
53~., p. 1404. 
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strategy. General Vandenberg replied that he and the rest of 
the Joint Chiefs had agreed quite generally, but that three 
individuals, representing three services, were going to have 
differences of opinion, and they had to be expressed very 
vigorously, if they were to be of any value to the Govern-
r:r.; ment.~' The fact is, of course, that these differences had 
to be resolved without public debate. 
The strategy of the Korean l.~ar, which lay \lri thin the 
realm of air power, was a major point of the MacArthur 
thesis. Vandenberg said that he was opposed to bombing mis-
sions north of the Yalu River, because a major involvement 
of air power in Manchuria and China would prevent us from 
being able to operate at full power in any other area. The 
forty-odd-proup Air Force of the United States was a "shoe-
string Air Force," yet it kept the balance of po"''er in our 
favor. 56 In the matter of hot pursuit Vandenberg :felt that 
it would hnve been of morale value to our Air Force, but 
would not have been decisive.57 
Sena,tor Smith asked the General if he thought l-1ac-
Arthur had misrepresented the Joint Chiefs by his reference 
to the January 12 trstudy" of possible alternative courses to 
be tftken if we vJere driven out of Korea. Vandenberg said 
55 Hearings, Part 2, P• 1384. 
56 l£1£., PP• 1378-79. 57 lQ!Q., P• 1388. 
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~ that he did not believe that MacArthur had misrepresented ~ 
~ 
! the Joint Chiefs, but that he did believe MacArthur must 
have misunderstood their intentions. 58 
Regarding the jw3ti:fication of MacArthur• s dismissal, 
Vandenberg said that he would not get into any of the legal 
ramifications of' intent because it had nothing to do \"i th 
his recommendations. Instead he put it on the ground that 
t'lacArthur did not see eye to eye on policy; that a field com-
mander had to be given considerable latitude, and in the use 
of that latitude, there vias danger if he felt strongly op-
posed to the policy,59 
The la.st of the Joint Chiefs to appear was Admiral 
J:,orrest P. Shermt::1.n, Chief of Naval Operations. The com-
mittee's chief interest in Admiral Sherman concerned the 
propoGed blockade o:f China. The Admiral cited a few per-
tinent examples of China's foreign trade. From Janua.ry to 
April 1951, over 450 American built trucks arrived in China. 
A considerable quantity of strategic materials went to China 
through Hong Kong. Also, India was an important reshipment 
region for thL'; sort of thing. 60 The weDJrnesses in the 
economic blockade could be reduced, and actually its eff'ec-
ti ve:ness \'las improvine; at that time. He favored a United 
58 Ibid., PP• 1396-97. 
60 Ibid., p. 1515. 
59 Ibid., p. 1391. 
61 Nations blockade, but not a unilateral one. 
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To understand the problems of a blockade, it is nee-
essary to consider the legal ramifications from the view-
point of international l<:>,w. Admiral Sl'1ermr.m reviewed these 
briefly. First, it is a belligerent right, and therefore 
implies a state of war. Second, it must be limited to the 
ports and coaJ:1t belonging to or occupied by an enemy. 
Third, it must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts. 
Ji'ourth, it must be applied equally to the ships of all 
nations. Finally, to be binding, it must be effective. 62 
The result of all these factors was that a blockade 
of China was vulnerable beCtlUse of the ports of Hong Kong 
and Dairen. the former was not a neutral port, but that did 
not change the fact that a great deal ofmerchandise went 
through it to China. Furthermore, a blockade would make 
China. more dependent upon Russia for war materials. How-
ever, the Hukden-Tient.sin Hailroad carried most of the sup-
plies from Russia, and it \vas long, inadequate, and vuln.er-
bl t l- • • b t d l . d. t. 6 3 a e o easy oomo1ng, sao age, an nava ra1 1ng par·1es. 
On the Joint Chiefs' study of January 12, Sherman 
said that it was conditional in nature; courses of action to 
be taken if events in Korea went against us. 64 Sherman 
61 Heariw{s, Part 2, p. 1530. 62 Ibid., P• 1513. 
64 Ibid., pp. 1532-33. 
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admitted that the Joint Chiefs were terribly worried about 
the possibility of being driven out of Korea. This worry 
was the reason for the study; most of the items indicated 
had been put into effect. It seemed to follow that there 
was good reason for MacArthur to believe that the whole plan 
would be put into effect, but all of the Joint Chiefs testi-
fied as to its conditional character. 
On the subject of MacArthur's relief, Senator Johnson 
asked if he had recommended it. The Admiral replied, "I did 
not recommend it, sir; I was asked for my military opinion 
and I gave it. n This was to the effect tha,t r'1acArthur should 
65 be relieved. 
Senator Bridges questioned Admiral Sherman concerning 
our objective in Korea; whether we were fighting for the 
original United Nations' objective of clearing the Reds out 
of Korea, or perhaps whether the Admiral had not been told 
what the objective really was. The Senator seems to have 
used the same label for the North Koreans as for the Chinese 
Communtsts. This may have been all right insofar as they 
v.rere both cut out of the sr.ane cloth, but it made a differ-
ence v.rhen it came to our objective. Admiral Sherman said 
that he believed the objective was to defeat the Chinese 
Communist Army within Korea and north of the Thirty-eighth 
65 Ibid., p. 1530. 
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66 Parallel. It is rather amazing to find that a person as 
highly placed as Admiral Sherman should not have the same un-
derstanding of the objective in Korea as the Secretary of 
Defense. General Marshall testified that the military ob-
jective was to repel the invasion of South Korea. Secretary 
of State Acheson testified similarily with respect to our 
objective. Sherman did agree with Marshall and Acheson that 
the strategy o:f punishing the Red Chinese in Korea offered 
the best chance of achieving success. However, should that 
policy suffer reverses, he felt then the strategy would 
have to be changed. 
Summary. The key witnesses against MacArthur were 
members of the Truman Administration. Acheson and Marshall 
were the principal critics of MacArthur's stand. Secretary 
Acheson testified that NacArthur had done a fine job in Japan 
and our allies agreed with our policy there. Acheson replied 
to the alleged lack of policy by making a distinction be-
tween our policy and our war aims. Our policy in Korea looked 
to a unified, independent democratic government, but our 
war aim was to stop the attack on South Korea. Regarding the 
proposal that the United States take unilateral action if 
our allies did not support us, he said that our collective-
security system could not survive if we took action other 
66 !Qi£., Part 2, p. 1528. 
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members of the system disapproved. He opposed the use of 
Nationalist troops on the grounds that it would weaken the 
defense of Formosa, and was complicated by other nations 
fighting in Korea that did not recognize the Nationalist 
Government. Finally Acheson denied that MacArthur was 
not allowed to issue battle communiques on the real mili-
tary situation in Korea. However, he felt that the Gen-
e:;ral' s release of March 20 concerning truce negotiations 
gave the impression that the United States was speaking 
with two voices. 
Secretary of Defense George Marshall had a military 
point of view and at the same time a global picture of the 
situation. He believed that the Nationalist forces would 
not be effective in Korea. He testified that MacArthur's 
removal was necessitated by his public disagreement with the 
foreign and defense policies of the United States. He made 
it clear that MacArthur ha.d not violated any military policy, 
but he had mEtde public his disagreement vlith it to such a 
degree that it interferred with the carrying out of that 
policy. All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall testi-
fied, concurred in the relief of General MacArthur. General 
Bradley's testimony was probably the most dt-l.rrtaging to Mac-
Arthur. The principal point brought out by Bradley was that 
MacArthur's strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at 
the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. 
131 
He pointed out that we also had sanctuary since the Chinese 
did not bomb our ports and supply bases. He felt that a 
blockade would involve the ports of Hong Kong and Dairen, 
and therefore would not be tenable. Furthermore, t-1ac.Arthur 
was not in agreement with the decision to lirrli t the conflict 
to Korea, and his actions, Bradley said, jeopardized the 
civilian control of the military authorities. 
Both Generals Bradley and Collins agreed tl1at they 
would have to re:z;ign and speak out in case they were in-
volved in a conflict in which duty and the best interest of 
the country could not be reconciled. 
CHAPTBH VII 
CONCI,USION 
Political factors. Tht3 imraediate problem of the com-
mittee vras the di.smissnl of General 11acArthur~ Just as im-
portant was the underlyir~ problem, the expanded role of the 
military i11 national affairs. Given the new international 
responsibilities of the United States, how could necessary 
military contributions be made without permitting a state 
of creeping militarism? The committee had to exaJnine the 
controversy in the light of the constitutional principle of 
civilian surpemacy, and determine where a breakdown had oc-
curred, for that was the real basis of MacArthur's dismissal. 
In order to keep the Hearings on as ne<1r a non-
partiso.n basis as possible, the committee decided that it 
would not publish any conclusion of its findings, but would 
permit the committee members to state their own conclusions 
in the Appendix. vlhile it seems strange that the cornmi ttee 
could not rise above partisanship on such an issue, perhaps 
it was the most realistic thing to do. After all, MacArthur 
certainly had moved on to the political stage. The point is 
that the immediate situation was fraught ltJi th political over-
tones, but the underlying problem should have been free from 
partisan debate. 
Since there was no limitation of issues or purpose, 
133 
some Senators ~1ere inclined to use the investigation :for 
political objectives. Senator Wiley said, "You have got some 
advocates instead of investigators." 1 However, the Senator 
was as sharply critical of the Administration, and as pro-
IvlacArthur, as anyone on the committee. Apparently it was 
politically expedient to side-step a conclusion at this 
time. Another time, wllen the~ temper of the nation was 
cooler, 1:1. conclusion probably would h<l..Ve been reached. 
One of tlle most important outcomes of the \-!hole in-
vestigation was the education of the public on our foreign 
and military policies. This can largely be attributed to 
the extensive coverage given by the press. However, the 
attitude of the press was generally pro-MacArthur. The 
Korean \t!ar was unpopular, and the Adrninistrr::.tion was blamed 
for it. The great concern of the press could not fail to 
influence the members of the committee to be diligent. 
Time magazine reported that there viaS a case to be 
made against the Admini;.:;tration, but that the Republicans 
failed woefully to make it. 2 This was because they \.;ere 
divided among themselves on }"'ar Bas tern policy. J!'urther-
more, many on the committee were favorably impressed by 
Secretary of State Acheson's grasp of the situation; this 
1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 915. 
2 Time, "The One That Got Away," June 18, 1951, 
pp. 22-23. 
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included Senator \'Jiley, who complimented the Secret::1ry on his 
knowledge of the complicated affairs of state. In spite of 
the failure of the Republicans to make their case, the dis-
missal of MacArthur was a factor in the Republican victory 
in 1952. A resurgence of isolationism occurred, and the 
General, as a national hero, was a political asset. His pro-
gram of building a Far Bastern policy around Chiang Kai-
shek r.:md United States air and sea power fitted neo-
isolationist patters of thoueht very well. 
The militar~ implications. On the military side, the 
policy of a limited war failed to capture the imagination of 
the American people, but it did prevent a general war in the 
F'ar East. In reality MacArthur's strategy was not so dif-
ficult a choice as that of the Joint Chiefs; he was backed 
by centuries of tradition. HovH:~ver, he was not backed by 
tradition when he decided to go over the head of the Pres-
ident Emd take his case to the people of the nation. The 
idea that MacArthur was unaware his line of action was im-
proper does not do justice to his intelligence. Further-
more, it is inconceivable that he would have tolerated any-
thing of a similar nature from one of his generals who dis-
agreed with his strategy or tactics. Therefore one can only 
conclude tha.t he believed that he must make himself a martyr 
to patriotism. Of course he did not doubt the loyalty of 
the President, the Joint Chiefs, or the Secretary of State, 
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but he did believe that they had been misinformed by people 
whose loyalty to American was questionable. 
The Hearint:ss seemed to point to generals lending 
themselves to political exploitation by both parties. 
Walter I,ippmann wrote that such a thinc.<:; \<Jould lead to an 
intolerable schism within the armed forces. The result 
would be generals of the Democratic Party and generals of 
the Republican Party. 3 
The investigation posed a threat to the confiden-
tial relationship between the President and his chief mili-
tary advisers~ The integrity of this relationship is vital 
to the security of the Nation. Fortunately it was upheld, 
and it is to be hoped that this precedent will stand. It is 
to be subjected to more tests because of the increasing in-
fluence of the military establishment. 
When it comes down to who was right and who was wrong 
in Korea there is no black and white answer. General Mac-
Arthur was wrong when he did not cooperate with the intent 
of the policy set down by 1'/ashington. He was inclined to 
say that tbere was no policy when it went contrary to his 
ovm. ideas. However, 'iJashington was not crystal clear about 
its objectives, and the fact that Admirt1l Sherman did not 
understand them to be exactly what Acheson and Ivia.rshall un-
3 New York Herald Tribune, April 30, 1951. 
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derstood them to be makes the point. It is quite possible 
that MacArthur could not accept the policy created in Wash-
ington. After all, his forces were nearly driven off the 
Korean peninsula, and he was bound to have some plans about 
what should be done under these circumstances. 
However, no one will ever know what the outcome of 
MacArthur's strategy would have been. It was bold and it 
was dangerous, but so was Inchon. The President and his 
advisers reluctantly went along with Inchon, but not \vi th 
the rest of MacArthur's recommendations, which they felt 
would spread the war. It was the President's move, not Mac-
Arthur's, and rightly or wrongly it was he who had to answer 
to the electorate, not MacArthur. Yet if MacArthur felt so 
strongly, it was his duty to speak out; but as a civilian, 
not as a general, a.nd especially not as a. theater commander 
in wartime. It would have been necessary for him to resign 
from the Army; hO\vever, he would have mc:tde a stronger case 
hc.-ld he done so. His activities not only weakened his argu-
ment. they increased the distrust of the military. 
Because of General MacArthur's many military suc-
cesses; particularly Inchon, he had good reason to have 
faith in his own theories and strategy. However, when he 
began to make plans which called for carrying the war to 
China, he enlarged upon the functions of a field comma.nder. 
In this situation he did not have as much information avail-
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able as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If he had been willing 
to limit his polemics to the Joint Chiefs, it seems prob-
able that he would have achieved some degree of success for 
his strategy. Instead he found himself in a situation in 
which the sails were too big for the ship, and it foundered 
in the storm. 
If the nation is to try to limit warfare, it is ob-
vious that it must have military commanders who are in agree-
ment with that principle. Modern communications hc-:we modi-
fied the degree of latitude necessary to give a field com-
mander. There is no doubt that field maneuvers cannot be 
dictated from Washington, so the degree of latitude allowed 
the commander is not fixed or absolute. This makes it all 
the more important that no conflict exists between these two 
areas. The fact that MacArthur erred in his handling of his 
differences with the President, but nevertheless retained 
the adrniration of so much o:f the nation, speaks out elo-
quently for him. Few people in our nation's history have 
been so wrong and so respected at the same time. However, 
it was just this respect and admiration that made the dis-
pute possible. From anyone else it would never have been 
allowed to reach such large proportions. 
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APPBNDIX 
Chronology of import&mt events. 
1. December 25, 1948--the Soviet Union announced the with-
drawal of its forces from. North Korea. 
2. June 29, 1949--the United States completed withdrawal 
of its occupation forces. 
3. June 5, 1950--North Korea proposed negotiations for an 
all-Korean assembly but refused to deal with the gov-
ermnent of .Syngman Hrwe. 
4. June 25, 1950--start of the Korean War. North Korean 
troops crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel at eleven 
lWints. 
5. June 27, 1950--United Nations Security Council asked 
member nntions to furnish assistance to the Republic 
of Korea. The United States intervened immediately. 
NacArthur was made Commanding General of the United 
Nations forces. 
6. Au,gust 28, 1950--NacArthur in a message to the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars opposed appeasement and defeatism which 
\vould lead to abandonment of Formosa. 
7. September 5, 1950--At its farthest advance North Korea 
held most of the Korean peninsula except for the Pusan 
beachhead. 
8. September 15, 1950--Inchon landing. 
9. October 9, 1950--fvlacArthur ordered United Ha.tions forces 
across the Thirty-eie;hth J)n.ral.lel. ~li thin three weeks 
his forces were approaching the Manchurian border at 
several points. 
10. October 15, 1950--I:Jake Island meeting. 
11. October 20, 1950--American troops captured Pyongyang, 
the capital of North Korea. 
12. October 28, 1950--Red Chinese Army elements were iden-
tified in North Korea. 
13. November 24, 1950--HacArthur launched an end-of-the-
war-by-Christmas offensive. 
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14. November 28, 1950--Red Chinese armies stalled and threw 
back General MacArthur's drive. 
15. November 28, 1950--MacArthur announced that the United 
Nations forces faced an entirely new war. 
16. December 1, 1950--MacArthur announced that orders for-
bidding him to attack Red Chinese north of the border 
put United Nations forces under "an enormous handicap 
without precedent in military history. 11 
17. December 6, 1950--Joint Chiefs advised MacArthur of a 
Presidential order requiring clearance of speeches and 
press releases with the Department of Defense or State, 
whichever was appropriate. 
18. March 7, 1951--United Nations forces recaptured Seoul. 
MacArthur reported thut the battle line would remain a 
theoretical military stalemate as long as there was "a 
continuation of the existi~; limitation upon our free-
dom of counter-offensive action and no major additions 
to United Nations strength in Korea." 
19. March 18, 1951--Congressrnan J¥1artin's letter to MacArthur 
inviting his views with respect to America's position in 
Asia. 
tljarch 20, 1951--Hacl\.rthur's reply to Congressman Ivlartin. 
20. March 20, 1951--MacArthur was advised by the Joint Chiefs 
of Sta.ff that the United Nations was prepared to dis-
cuss conditions of settlement in Korea, and that the 
Thirty-eiehth Parallel had no military significance. 
t'1acArthur' s recommendations on military procedures were 
invited. 
21. March 24, 1951--MacArthur's ultimatum to the Chinese mil-
itary commander. 
22. March 24, 1951--A Joint Chiefs' message to MacArthur ad-
vised that the President had directed his attention be 
called to the Presidential order of December 6, 1950; 
also advised that any further statements must be coor-
dinated as provided in that order. 
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23. The State Department subsequently announced that the 
political issues which General MacArthur had stated were 
beyond his responsibility as a field corrunander; that 
the.\' \.Jere being dealt with in the United Nations and by 
intergovernmental consultations. 
24. April 11, 1951--General MacArthur was relieved of his 
command by the order of I)resident Truman. 
